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THE WORLD BANK'S DOUBLESPEAK ON TEACHERS

An Analysis of Ten Years of Lending and Advice



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1. INTRODUCTION

During the last few decades, the World Bank has become a central actor in shaping the global education policy agenda. Since the approval of its first education loan in 1962, this international organisation has become increasingly involved in education to the point of becoming the largest supplier of external funding to the sector. Importantly, the priorities or focus of attention of the World Bank (hereafter also ‘the Bank’ or the WB) in education have also evolved. Whilst it was mainly focused on the material dimension of the education system (such as school infrastructure, textbooks, material assets for workshops and laboratories, and so on), over time, more intangible issues including learning outcomes and education quality have gained centrality in the Bank’s lending portfolio (Jones, 2007; Mundy and Verger, 2015). As part of this shift, teacher policies have also received increasing attention in the Bank’s interventions. This focus on teachers on behalf of the Bank has been reinforced over the years following the finding of the impact of teachers on student learning outcomes and, accordingly, on countries’ economic competitiveness (Robertson, 2012). Thus, by doing so, the World Bank joins a broader consensus that has been forged within the international development community concerning the key role that teachers potentially play in the promotion of quality education for all (Leu, 2005; UNESCO, 2005), and that the well-known 2007 McKinsey report brought to an end when sentencing that “the quality of an education system cannot exceed the quality of its teachers” (McKinsey, 2007: 4).

The prominent role of the World Bank in the global governance of education cannot be understood solely on the grounds of its material power. Hence, its capacity to influence policy goes beyond its lending activity and also involves a significant “ideational” power propagated through the production of knowledge, e.g., publishing of reports, academic articles, and policy briefs among other publications (Steiner-Khamsi, 2012; Verger et al., 2014). As recalled by Steiner-Khamsi (2012), the World Bank has reinvented itself and now operates as a knowledge bank, acting increasingly as a “global policy advisor for national governments” and elevating itself “into the role of the ‘super think tank’ among the aid agencies that, based on its extensive analytical work, knows what is good for recipient countries but also what other aid agencies should support” (Steiner-Khamsi, 2012: 5). Similarly, Jones (2007) notes that Bank policies in education can be distinguished or identified by two main methods, namely: the observation of the accumulation of projects, and the body of different types of publications directed to influence common or global understanding of education



policy. In their study of the World Bank's policy on education privatisation, Mundy and Menashy (2014) also distinguish between knowledge and lending products. Interestingly, they find that there is a disjuncture between the policy discourse and the practice of the Bank regarding education privatisation, with an official discourse that is more pro-privatisation than the actual operations on the ground.¹

Building on these insights, the main questions that inspire the present study are: *How are teachers conceived and portrayed in both the World Bank's knowledge products and in the lending projects financed by this organisation? Which are the teacher policies most commonly recommended and prescribed in both the World Bank publications and operations?* Specifically, the objectives of this study are to:

1. Examine how teachers, as well as teachers' unions, are characterised in the World Bank's knowledge products, or publications, that have been released in the last decade, and determine what are the "teacher-related issues" most frequently emphasised in them.
2. Find out which are the policy prescriptions recommended or advocated for in the World Bank's knowledge products, with a focus on the level of consistency or logical correspondence between detected problems and proposed solutions.
3. Review the policies and measures concerning teachers as stipulated in the World Bank's lending projects and guidelines (approved since 2005), identifying the practices and policy programmes most commonly put into practice, as well as those problems intended to be addressed.
4. Examine to what extent the World Bank's operations reflect the discourse contained in its more emblematic "knowledge products", paying special attention to possible inconsistencies (as per Mundy and Menashy's (2014) analysis of the education privatisation agenda of the Bank mentioned above).
5. Based on the above analysis, determine the paradigm of teachers' reform that tends to predominate in the World Bank's programmes and identify the effects of this prevalence.

1.1. Methodology

To achieve these objectives, the present study has employed a content analysis methodology, understood as a set of techniques intended to collect information, produce indicators, and organise information through a systematic classification process of identifying, coding and counting themes, enabling the inference of characteristics and meaning from a large corpus of written texts and/or to test previously established hypotheses (cf. Bardin, 1996 and Neuendorf, 2002). Taking into account the distinction between policy and practice, which is central in the objectives of this research, two main types of documents have been selected for analysis: (i) **knowledge products**, published by the World Bank, including policy briefs, technical reports, research papers, sector strategies and books; and (ii) **lending projects** of the World Bank, including project appraisal documents for specific investment loans, adaptable programme loans and credits, sector development policy loans and credits, additional grants, and emergency recovery loans.

The selection of the documents has been based on the following criteria:

- Date: references between 2005 and 2014.
- Education level: primary and secondary education.
- Knowledge products: presence of the term 'teacher(s)' in the title or clear focus on teachers. Moreover, considering their particularly influential or "ground-breaking" nature, three additional documents have also been included in the corpus: the World Bank Education Strategy 2020, the Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER)-Teachers Framework documents, and the book, *Making Schools Work: New Evidence on Accountability Reforms*. In this booklet, these documents are taken separately and presented in independent boxes, although they are also included in the corpus of knowledge products collected for the general analysis.
- Lending projects: projects included one of the teacher-related categories according to the categorisation provided by the World Bank Education Projects Database.

A total of 48 knowledge documents and 133 lending projects' documents have been identified according to these criteria (see Appendices 2 and 3). Each document has been examined on the basis of a previously set list of categories that has enabled the identification of teacher-related problems and their attributed causes, recommended or prescribed policies, and inclination toward teachers' unions. In order to proceed with the codification of the selected documents, a repertoire of items and themes inductively defined has enabled the identification of those problems and policies more



frequently considered in the corpus of reviewed documents. This list has constituted the basis for the data collection instrument, under the form of a synthesis matrix (see Appendix 4). As part of teachers' related data, more descriptive data, including geographical area, date and 'genre' of the document has also been collected with the aim of discerning possible patterns based on these features. The synthesis matrix used in the process can be consulted in *Appendix 1*.

The codification process has enabled the quantification of types of predominant approaches in the selected documents on a range of teachers' related matters. In the case of knowledge products, this quantification evidences the themes and questions that orient the policy and research agendas of the Bank – revealing what this institution identifies as the main challenges or “issues” in relation to teachers. Moreover, the identification of a range of policy options and the stance taken by the Bank regarding these practices reveal the policy preferences of the institution. Similarly, in relation to lending projects, the authors quantified the “issues” most frequently requiring the WB's attention and the commonly prescribed policies, both illuminating the Bank's views on the weak points and necessary solutions with respect to teachers.

1.2. Conceptual framework

Within the international education community there is broad consensus on the key role of teachers in the improvement of education systems, yet there is not such an agreement concerning which specific types of teachers' policies and accountability measures can contribute to promote quality education more effectively. Scholars, such as Cochran-Smith (2000, 2001), Connell (2009) and Zeichner (2003) have distinguished between different - and even competing - teachers' reform agendas, including professionalisation, deregulation, over-regulation, and social justice agendas. On their part, Maroy (2008) and Maroy and Voisin (2013) have categorised different modes of institutional regulation of education systems (namely, bureaucratic-professional models and post-bureaucratic models, including a quasi-market and an evaluative state approach), as well as distinct understandings of teachers' accountability – some of them more supportive of a teachers' professionalisation agenda and some of them more supportive of a deregulation agenda. In the same vein, Mons and Dupriez (2010) distinguish between hard, soft, and reflexive accountability policies. Building on these notions of teacher development and accountability reforms, four (competing) and general teacher policy agendas can be distinguished:²

² The fact that these categories – which will be used to analyse the documents that are part of the research corpus - are grounded on existing literature on teachers' policy and accountability reforms ensures both their theoretical adequacy and their analytical value.

- **Professionalisation agenda.** This agenda puts emphasis on pre-service and in-service training and practical experience for novice teachers and promotion of in-school and peer-based forms of professional development and mentorship and induction programmes; preference for selective pre-service training programmes and high professional qualifications standards; teachers' welfare; labour regularisation, and public recognition.
- **Competition and/or market agenda.** The main measures contemplated here are the promotion of contract and/or para-teachers: flexible and alternative paths of entrance to the profession and preference for school-based management (community or school councils enjoying substantial decision-making power regarding staff hiring and firing).
- **Managerialist or neo-bureaucratic agenda.** This agenda emphasises high-stakes testing and the need for policies facilitating dismissals (probation periods, performance-based tenure); promotion of performance-based incentives (bonuses, awards, career advancement opportunities and pay) and attention to monitoring and evaluation systems and the improvement of human resources management; and principals' decision-making power on staff management.
- **Efficiency driven agenda.** This agenda pays attention to teachers' deployment policies (need for hardship bonuses and the revision of transfer criteria), contract teachers, emphasis on the optimisation of pupil-teacher ratios and promotion of multi-grade instruction.

To a great extent, these categories will guide our review of the World Bank documents and interventions affecting teachers. By identifying and quantifying the WB's policy preferences included in our sample of documents, we will be able to discuss which of these different agendas predominates in the Bank's approach to teachers' reforms.

This analysis will be conducted by assuming that a particular constellation of policies advanced in the reviewed documents is indicative of the priority given to each one of these agendas. However, it is also important to mention that these teachers' reform agendas are conceived as 'ideal types' as the authors do not expect them to crystallise in a pure form in real situations. Accordingly, in the World Bank's policies on teachers, the authors expect to identify some hybrid agendas or constellations of policies that could correspond to rather different reform approaches.



1.3. About this booklet

Overall, this booklet shows that the World Bank does not have a monolithic vision on teachers nor does it advocate for a unique package of teacher-related policies. The different documents analysed in this review reflect very diverse points of view coexisting within this international organisation on the same teacher-related themes (such as the contribution of teachers to education quality, the role of teachers' unions in educational reform, and so on). At the same time, different and, at times, conflicting teachers' reforms and policies are advocated by the Bank. Although some common patterns can be identified in both knowledge products and lending projects, there is an evident tension in the teachers' conceptions and policies identified across these two types of documents. Broadly speaking, it could be considered that the World Bank knowledge products reflect a certain preference for a managerialist or neo-bureaucratic agenda and are especially concerned with teachers' lack of effort in many educational settings. On the other hand, the World Bank's lending projects seem to be more supportive of a professionalisation agenda and place a greater emphasis on the necessity of improving teachers' training.

This study's findings also suggest that there is an important degree of regional variation in the World Bank's approach to teachers. For instance, in relation to lending projects, the promotion of controversial reforms such as contract teachers, school-based management, and performance-based incentives is particularly present in the South-Asia region, but is not so evident in other regions. The conception of teachers' unions also varies noticeably among the different regions where the Bank operates. Teachers' unions in Sub-Saharan Africa are conceived as a potential ally in numerous World Bank publications and projects, whereas these teachers' organisations are especially stigmatised in the World Bank literature on Latin American education.

This booklet presents these and many other findings in three main sections. In the first section, the content of the World Bank's research products focusing on teachers is analysed. The second section concentrates on the analysis of those World Bank's lending projects with teachers' components. The third and final section discusses the main results from a comparative perspective and presents the main conclusions of the research. In particular, this last section explores the possible reasons for the observed gap between "talk and action" in the World Bank's approach to teachers' reforms.

2. TEACHERS IN THE WORLD BANK KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTS

Drawing on a corpus of WB knowledge products, this section aims to capture how teachers are considered to contribute to education quality, and which policy options are recommended to strengthen the link between teachers and education quality. Section 2.1 explores the range of “teacher issues” that are considered to impinge on education quality, including the preferred explanations of why teachers represent a challenge for educational quality in many developing contexts. Section 2.2 deals with how the WB’s knowledge products characterise teachers’ unions, and outlines the related policy advice for governments on how to engage with this type of organisation. Section 2.3 addresses the preferred policy options outlined in Bank publications for intervening in a range of teacher-related areas such as teachers’ labour conditions, teacher training, and so on. This section ends with a more in-depth discussion of three emblematic World Bank documents that directly engage with teachers’ debates.

2.1. Teachers and quality education: a multi-faceted relationship

2.1.1. A “far from satisfactory” contribution

In general terms, the World Bank literature conceives teachers as key agents in students’ learning, but it tends to do so by portraying teachers as **poor contributors to the quality of education systems**, if not ultimately responsible for the limited levels of student learning. In fact, one-third of the examined documents make explicit reference to the uneven levels of teacher effectiveness or to the effects of individual teachers on students’ test scores. One of the central tenets of the Bank is that the ‘quality’ or ‘effectiveness’ of teachers is the main (school-based) factor affecting student achievement.

“A series of great or bad teachers over several years compounds these effects and can lead to unbridgeable gaps in student learning levels. No other attribute of schools comes close to this impact on student achievement” (Bruns and Luque, 2014: 6).³

“Quality teachers are one of the most important school-related factors found to facilitate student learning and likely explain at least some of the difference in effectiveness across schools” (Loeb et al., 2012: 271).

³ Here, the authors remark on the impact of teacher effectiveness on students’ mastery of the curriculum, college participation rates, and subsequent income.



"The broad consensus is that teacher quality is the single most important school variable influencing student learning (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005)" (Pandey et al., 2008: 13).

"A number of studies have found that teacher effectiveness is the most important school-based predictor of student learning and that several consecutive years of outstanding teaching can offset the learning deficits of disadvantaged students" (World Bank, 2012: 5).

2.1.2. Lacking professionalism

However, the explanations for the poor quality of teachers and teaching practices are quite varied in nature. A first group of "symptoms", and by far the most frequently documented, are those related to the idea of "lack of effort", "**deliberate negligence**", or "lack of professionalism" (46.88 per cent of WB knowledge products). Hence, a noticeable number of documents⁴ conceive teachers as dishonest employees likely to have a casual attitude to work. Nearly half of the documents analysed make some reference to poor teaching as a consequence of idleness during instructional hours (as opposed to a hard-working or industrious attitude), including an intentional loss of instruction time, a poor use of available material, a deliberate neglect of responsibilities, inactivity or lack of engagement when in the classroom, deliberate absenteeism, and unofficial "shortenings" of the school day or week.

Among these factors, **absence rates** are at the centre of the World Bank's discourse on teachers' attitudes. References to non-attendance or absenteeism can be found in three-quarters of the reviewed publications, usually regarded as an important factor contributing to poor learning outcomes. Thus, the idea of the absent teacher is clearly a pervasive one in the Bank's literature. Two seminal works, repeatedly referenced in the reviewed publications, are the most important source of evidence on the matter for the Bank, namely, the work of Chaudhury et al. (2006)⁵ and of Kremer et al. (2005).⁶

⁴ If not stated otherwise, knowledge products do not include SABER-Teachers' country cases.

⁵ Chaudhury, N., Hammer, J., Kremer, M., Muralidharan, K., and Rogers, F. H. (2006). "Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20 (1): 91–116, and the variation. Chaudhury, N., Hammer, J., Kremer, M., Muralidharan, K., and Rogers, F. H. (2004). "Teacher and Health Care Provider Absenteeism: A Multi-Country Study." World Bank: Washington, DC.

⁶ Kremer, M., Chaudhury, N., Rogers, F. H., Muralidharan, K., Hammer, J. (2005). "Teacher Absence in India: A Snapshot." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3 (2–3): 658–67. Also found as Chaudhury, N., M. Kremer, F. H. Rogers, J. Hammer, and K. Muralidharan (2005). "Teacher Absence in India: A Snapshot." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3 (2–3): 658–67.

BOX 1. MANAGING INSTRUCTIONAL TIME

The **loss of instructional time** is addressed by a number of lending projects, constituting a distinct category of problems (see next section). Attention to this issue seems to owe much to the work of Abadzi (2007), who spent almost 30 years as senior education specialist at the World Bank. Abadzi emphasises the relationship between instructional time and student achievement, noting that “variables measuring curricular exposure are strong predictors of test scores and correlations between content exposure and learning are typically higher than correlations between specific teacher behaviours and learning” (p. 17). Her work draws attention to the fact that, in poor areas, the loss of instructional time is particularly striking, and she developed a “time loss model” that considers the effect of school closures, teacher absenteeism and tardiness, student absenteeism, non-instructional time (organisation and management activities) and deviations from prescribed curriculum. Albeit admitting that these losses are sometimes legitimate or involuntary, the policy guidance recommended by her study emphasises the need for accountability, monitoring, and control mechanisms, suggesting that the poor use of time is considered the result of a deliberate decision in a context of weak supervision.

2.1.3. A matter of accountability

In many of the Bank publications, issues of under-performance and deliberate absenteeism go hand-in-hand with explanations pointing to the ineffectiveness or absence of supervisory structures and, in particular, a lack of accountability systems. It is suggested that teachers do not make an effort (or shirk their responsibilities) as a consequence of not being held directly accountable for student learning. Up to 43.75 per cent of the documents allude to a “**lack of performance-based incentives**”, and consider that fixed wages, job stability, and promotions that are unresponsive to performance levels demotivate teachers and keep incompetent individuals in the profession. Among this group of documents, some call into question permanent tenure or open-ended appointments, while others make reference to systems that reward credentials rather than performance, absence of performance-based bonuses, or pre-arranged and invariable salaries. In fact, the notion of “incentive” (as an element likely to encourage good performance and effort) includes a variety of interpretations, ranging from monetary and non-monetary rewards to the “fear” of job loss. In any case, the perceived harmful effects of uniform and equal labour conditions (regardless of performance) emerge as a cross-cutting idea within these documents. The following excerpt captures and synthesises this widespread approach:



"Most education systems globally are characterized by fixed salary schedules, lifetime job tenure, and flat labor hierarchies, which create a rigid labor environment where extra effort, innovation, and good results are not rewarded and where dismissal for poor performance is exceedingly rare (Weisberg and others, 2009)" (Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos, 2011: 18)

While many of the documents point to a lack of accountability to education authorities (or to an undefined agent), a second group of documents refers more explicitly to an **insufficient accountability of teachers towards parents, school communities, or local communities**. Specifically, 28.13 per cent of the knowledge products point to an inadequate monitoring of teachers (and, more particularly, teachers' attendance) by citizens, who are conceived as the ultimate consumers of education. In this narrative, it is assumed that the lack of "voice" or feedback opportunities by the so-called education clients account for the existence of neglectful teachers. Among other issues, these documents refer to a lack of "real" decision-making power (e.g. school councils unable to hire and fire school staff), self-perceived disempowerment among families (as in the case of parents with low levels of education attainment), or a lack of interest/awareness among communities about their own responsibilities concerning teachers' management.

2.1.4. Mitigating responsibility

Although less frequently than accountability related explanations, an important number of the documents (34.38 per cent) consider a range of mitigating factors that effect the degree of teachers' responsibility for their own poor performance and non-attendance. These are "**extenuating circumstances**" affecting teachers (i.e. factors beyond teachers' control) including the effect of school location (rural or remote areas), the impact of illness-related factors (particularly HIV/AIDS affecting teachers or teachers' relatives), external obligations (such as electoral duties), the need to travel to collect salaries or participate in training, and the impact of second jobs ("moonlighting" resulting from low salaries) or double-shift schemes.⁷

Importantly, this group of explanations gives rise to a highly polarised distinction between two competing approaches regarding teacher absence, as shown in Figure 1.


⁷ The consideration of non-deliberate absenteeism or the "refinement" in causal explanations seems to be particularly the case for those reports that form part of the collection Africa Human Development Series, produced "in the field" (as opposed to those produced by Washington-based teams or researchers).

At one end of the spectrum, half of the publications documenting absence rates regard them as the result of a deliberate neglect.⁸ At the other end of the spectrum, another half of the publications dealing with teacher absence consider factors that are outside of teachers' control. The existence of these two competing approaches regarding teacher absence, and the tension this generates when it comes to the construction of coherent policy diagnoses, is well captured in the following excerpt:

"In attributing all teacher absence to negative shocks, we have probably been overly generous—it is likely that at least some portion of teacher absence is due to shirking rather than illness (...) The situation in low-income countries may be very different. Certainly, studies in India (Chaudhury and others, 2005) suggest that teacher absenteeism is largely due to shirking rather than illness. Jacobson's work however, cautions us in extrapolating views from one continent to another. If teachers in Zambia and other Sub-Saharan countries are absent because they shirk and incentive schemes and greater accountability lead both to greater attendance and better performance, then such schemes can lead to better learning outcomes. However, if teachers' utility functions are altruistic so that most absenteeism is "genuine", incentive schemes might hurt teacher motivation" (Das et al, 2005: 20-21).

"One note on terminology: The term 'absenteeism' is widely used in this literature. In this chapter, we prefer the term 'absence', which we view as less judgmental, but sometimes use 'absenteeism' when referring to high levels of apparently volitional absence, or when citing work that uses the term" (Rogers and Vegas, 2009: unnumbered).

FIGURE 1 - References to teacher absences - Knowledge products



⁸ In the present study, the authors consider that this category includes those documents that do not specify external causes as possible explanations for non-attendance (implying a volitional dimension).

2.1.5. The importance of preparation

Deficient **teacher training** is also often used to explain the poor performance of teachers. In this respect, the presence of **untrained teachers** in the profession appears to be the most worrying dimension: up to 28.13 per cent of the reviewed documents cite the existence of teachers with lower than officially required credentials, the lack of a certification process, or the deployment of so-called para-teachers (i.e. teachers hired on short-term temporary contracts who generally lack qualifications and training) as problematic. One in four of the documents mentions insufficient and **poor quality pre-service** teacher education, aggravated by unavailable or unsatisfactory **professional development**. The explanations for poor training and professional development are diverse, including obsolete content and methodologies, poorly equipped educators, an excessively liberalised sector, and the non-compulsory nature of in-service training.

According to 21.88 per cent of the publications, low levels of performance in education systems are also explained by the composition of the teaching force. These documents regard the teaching profession as unable to attract and retain well-prepared individuals. This is a result of teacher training programmes not being selective and/or the unattractive labour conditions of the teaching profession in most developing countries. These explanations suggest that teachers who are already in the profession are unable to face the challenges of educating children.


2.1.6. Management issues and labour welfare

In many of the reviewed documents, teachers are approached from a cost-efficiency perspective. A significant number of them emphasise the **proportion of education budgets allocated to teachers' salaries** or salary related expenditures. Specifically, 34.38 per cent of the documents highlight these figures, which - although it is not always clearly or overtly portrayed as a "problem" - reinforces the idea that countries need to strengthen the efficiency of their education systems by paying special attention to 'human resources'.

This latter theme is usually related to the **territorial allocation** of the teaching force. One-fifth (21.88 per cent) of the publications document an uneven distribution of teachers, noting the co-existence of shortages in rural or remote areas with oversupplies in urban or higher-density areas and emphasising the impact of inadequate transfer criteria or deployment policies. Other efficiency related issues such as **low pupil-teacher ratios, light workloads**, the proportion of **non-teaching staff** or excessively high salaries receive less attention; combined, they are mentioned in 21.88 per cent of the documents. A smaller proportion of publications (18.76 per cent) refer to the effects of **corruption** (including rent-seeking, nepotism and "ghost teachers") in the hiring or deployment of teachers.

Finally, **absolute shortages** are also the object of considerable attention, being mentioned in 22.6 per cent of the documents. Different factors appear to explain insufficient teacher supply, including a restricted output of teacher training institutions, the impact of HIV/AIDS, and the effects of unattractive labour conditions. In fact, and in connection with the labour conditions, issues affecting **teachers' welfare** also receive quite some attention: up to 31.25 per cent of the documents highlight the harmful effects of low, unpunctual, or irregular remuneration, as well as the teachers' dependence on community contributions for their salaries or a lack of labour protection. Interestingly, job insecurity and inadequate consideration of contract teachers constitute the exclusive focus of one of the studies. Robinson and Gauri (2010) note that Courts (and particularly the Supreme Court) in India appear to be increasingly unreceptive towards contract teachers' claims. The authors emphasise the Courts' uncritical acceptance of the governmental use of contract teachers and their adoption of a hands-off position towards economic liberalisation, ultimately resulting in a constriction of labour protections (including regularisation, union rights and equal pay for equal work) with the argument that they prevent labour liquidity. Although this is a rather exceptional perspective in the World Bank context, these assertions deserve some attention, considering the allegedly excessive labour protection and, as developed below, the uncritical advocacy for contract teachers that prevails within this organisation.

FIGURE 2 - **Most frequently reported teacher-related issues**
Knowledge products





2.2. Teachers' unions and educational reform

Teachers' unions/organisations (hereafter also TUs) receive only limited attention in the World Bank publications. They are mentioned in over half of the documents, but are usually treated as a secondary actor. However, when mentioned, unions are generally portrayed in negative terms. In nine documents, unions are overtly regarded as contributing to "rigid" labour regulation that prevents improvement in the quality of the system, or leads to a higher per student cost. Moreover, some documents regard teacher organisations as likely to "jeopardise" the original or genuine intentions of a given reform. This is particularly the case for the works authored by Chang et al. (2014), Bruns et al. (2011), and Bruns and Luque (2014). In addition, these documents conceive of unions not only as a risk or challenge during reform implementation, but also as possible contributors to pro-tenure regulation for contract teachers, which is something that their authors view as problematic because it distorts the original rationale for contract-teacher policies. For instance, Bruns et al. (2011) report how in Madhya Pradesh in India, union mobilisation to match contract and regular teachers' employment terms contributed to reducing the expected and desired differential in performance incentives between contract teachers and regular teachers.

The book, *Great Teachers*, authored by Bruns and Luque (2014), is especially informative about the vision and mission of the World Bank concerning teacher unions. With a focus on Latin America and the Caribbean, the book devotes an entire chapter (titled "Managing the Politics of the Teacher Reform") to analyse the role of teachers' unions, accompanied by policy/political guidance. As a starting point, it is worth noting that unions are explicitly portrayed as having opposing interests to those of education administrators and recipients:

"Like all organized workers, teachers' unions exist to defend the rights they legitimately earn through negotiations and to oppose policy changes that threaten those rights. Teachers and their representatives are entirely justified in pursuing these goals (...) [b]ut it is also true that the goals of teachers' organizations are not congruent with the goals of education policy makers or the interests of education beneficiaries—including students, parents, and employers who need skilled workers" (Bruns and Luque, 2014: 287-288).

The book argues quite plainly that, since unions try to block educational reforms that are expected to work in the public interest, the power of unions should be reduced. The authors note that since most education reforms threaten unions' interests (i.e. they usually result in a reduction of teachers' benefits, alter their working conditions, or threaten unions' structure and power), teachers' resistance must be (primarily) understood on the grounds of "special interests pursuing a self-interested agenda" (cf. Gindin and Finger, 2013):

"LAC [Latin America and Caribbean] countries—like those in other regions—pursue a wide variety of strategies for raising education quality and improving efficiency. Teachers' unions resist a number of these, either by blocking them from adoption or undermining them during implementation. Unions' resistance to reforms can generally be traced to threats these pose to members' benefits (salaries, pensions, and job stability); their working conditions and challenges (curriculum changes, student testing, performance evaluation, and accountability pressure); or the union's own survival. Teachers' unions perceive clearly that policies that impact their size or structure—ranging from decentralization proposals to career path reforms that differentiate salaries based on competency—can fragment union membership and undermine the capacity for collective action, which is a fundamental source of union power" (Bruns and Luque, 2014: 288).

At the same time, the introduction of educational reforms needs to be seen, inherently, as a strategy to fight against teachers' organised action. This seems to be a priority particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean since, in this region, unions are "considered especially strong, with a history of effective use of direct electoral influence as well as disruptive actions in the streets to block reforms perceived as a threat to their interests" (287).

The book also problematises what it considers as teachers' unions mobilising the quality education framework as a way to strengthen teachers' power and their membership:

"Teachers' organizations have overwhelming incentives to exert political pressure in this area. First, smaller class size is popular with members because it facilitates their work. Second, it directly contributes to union power because it implies the hiring of more teachers and expansion of union numbers" (Bruns and Luque, 2014: 296).

When discussed, industrial action is depicted as a negative act rather than as a legitimate political instrument or a labour right. In Bruns and Luque (2014), for instance, the "troubling" nature of protests is made explicit and underscored. As a word-association technique reveals: actions in the streets are termed as "disruptive", confrontation is explicitly labelled as "bitter", and strikes are described/qualified as "violent", "painful", "damaging" and "disruptive". This critical approach to strikes or mobilisations can also be found in the work of Abadzi (2007), who emphasises the impact of these practices in terms of time lost for student learning:

"Teacher unions and the strikes they proclaim account for various amounts of time loss worldwide. The conflicts between governments and the teachers'



unions may affect student performance. In Mexico it was found that union power is associated with test outcomes; (...) medium power was found to be significant and had a relatively large negative effect. In Argentina, adversarial political alignments were associated with a decrease in effective numbers of class days, with an indirect negative effect on student performance in Argentina" (Abadzi, 2007: 12).

Bruns and Luque (2014) offer some policy guidance to deal with unions, encouraging governments to confront sensible issues (likely to be resisted by teachers) in a direct way, but advising them against the confrontation this may generate. Some of these "tips" include the launching of reforms at the start of an administration, their sequential or progressive implementation, or the construction of strategic alliances, a strategy already recommended by Bruns et al. (2011).

"Uniting two sides of the stakeholder triangle (civil society and government) against the third (organized teachers) can create political space for the adoption of reforms, including the three that most directly threaten the interests of teachers as an organized group: individual performance evaluation, differentiated pay, and loss of job stability" (Bruns and Luque, 2014: 324).

"It is important to recognize up-front that accountability-oriented reforms implemented at any scale will likely face challenges, from both teachers' unions and education bureaucracies. Working as much as possible to create coalitions for reform—and using information and communications channels to drive home the goals and benefits of the reforms—is critical" (Bruns et al., 2011: 246).

The authors are also well aware that unions' fragmentation (geographic or by education level) favours the implementation of reforms. Consistently, they provide recommendations on how to "divide" the profession. Among other things, they recommend inviting teachers to renounce tenure or related benefits in exchange for the application of merit-based pay policies that may imply salary increases.

"Governments appear to perceive that the fragmentation of interests that threatens union power can also mean potential allies for proposed reforms within the teaching force. This split has been clearly visible in career path reforms in the U.S. context (...) Similar dynamics are beginning to be observed in Latin American cases" (Ibid., 2011: 294).

Nonetheless, other World Bank publications appear to have a relatively more "benevolent" attitude towards teachers' organisations. Interestingly, four of the five publications with such an approach to TUs are focused on the Sub-Saharan Africa region, where unions are expected to play a positive role in the development of the

education system. Accordingly, in these documents, TUs are not portrayed simply as vested interests but as potential allies.⁹

"Teachers' unions have become important professional and political forces in many Sub-Saharan African countries in shaping the conditions of teachers' working lives. They operate largely as trade unions, with the goal of protecting interests and promoting cooperation among teachers (Farrell and Oliveira, 1993). However, in some countries, teachers' unions have broadened their interests and are engaging as partners with governments in educational quality improvement initiatives. This is often accomplished through professional development activities for union members. In doing so, unions provide a mechanism through which teachers can be more effectively represented and consulted on the issues, programs, and policies that affect them (Farrell and Oliveira, 1993)" (Mulkeen et al., 2007: 31).

Finally, it should be noted that some documents take a rather ambivalent (or simply more nuanced) position. This is the case with *Incentives to Improve Teaching* (Vegas, 2005), which recalls the "unpredictability" or, at least, variability regarding the effect of unions on education quality. In fact, the book presents a rather ambiguous stance regarding these organisations and seem to avoid black-and-white positions, although in some cases it seems to embrace a rather critical standpoint. This is particularly the case for Chapter 11, *Political Economy, Incentives and Teachers' Unions*. Case Studies in Chile and Peru, authored by L. Crouch. Although the text makes explicit that "the intent of the chapter is not so much to provide generalizable lessons or to test hypotheses, as to point toward agendas for further analysis", the chapter ends up drawing some generalist – and not particularly positive – conclusions about the role that teachers' unions can play in education politics.

"In both the United States and Latin America, unions have themselves become monopolistic and bureaucratic. They have typically succeeded in increasing salaries (...) But, in so doing, they have used tactics that were borrowed from industrial unionism and that have typically not led to an improved sense of professionalism or autonomy (...) This very deprofessionalization is generating internal pressures within unions, because the rank and file have professional and individual aspirations. However, the leadership frequently may prefer to work with a unified, collectivized mass that is easier to mobilize (in some cases to achieve collective goals that the rank and file themselves approve of)" (Crouch, in Vegas, 2005: 418-419).


⁹ On their part, Bundy et al. (2009) are very positive about teachers' unions in relation to HIV/AIDS issues. Unions are regarded as organisations of great value, supporting HIV-affected members, combating stigma and offering practical care organising voluntary counselling and testing campaigns and financial aid, protecting teachers in the workplace.

The chapter, however, combines this approach with other passages emphasising the scope and need for cooperation:

“One may find it expedient to formally involve unions in developing the work rules and broad incentives, and in monitoring, as long as they are willing to take formal, professional, accountability for results. This inclusion may be expedient to minimize the tendency of unions to block implementation after the experiments are designed. It may be expedient, also, because ultimately teachers will have good, applied ideas about school improvements. Their voiced suggestions may carry more implementation weight if they have been collectively vetted” (Crouch, in Vegas, 2005: 420).

Ultimately, the chapter seem to avoid antagonistic positions but, at the same time, it appears to be more concerned by the potential “risk” posed by unions, and to value unions’ participation only when some sort of cooperation and ideological affinity is secured.

FIGURE 3 - Knowledge products discussing teachers’ unions



2.3. Policy recommendations and advice

2.3.1. Enhancing accountability: a managerialist agenda

A very significant part of the World Bank’s policy guidance addresses the issues of teachers’ contribution to education quality. Among the extensive list of policy solutions, the use of performance-based incentives clearly stands out and is by far the most widely recommended policy: half of the documents suggest some form of reward on the basis of results. Nevertheless, a wide variety of possible incentive schemes designs are considered, as shown in the following excerpt:

“Taken together, merit pay, certification pay and attendance pay can all be considered examples of “performance incentives” for existing teachers, whereas hardship pay and scarce-expertise pay are designed to recruit teachers for specific locations or fields of teaching. Incentive programs can be targeted at individual teachers (teacher incentive programs) or an entire school (“whole school” incentive programs); they may or may not be competitive” (Lockheed, 2014: 2-3).

Although the nature of incentive frameworks is not always specified, they are generally equalled to one-time allowances added to a (previously fixed) salary (i.e. financial bonuses). However, more drastic incentive schemes include career path reform establishing promotions on the basis of skills and performance (as opposed to seniority) and widening salary differentiation between teachers (see Bruns and Luque, 2014). These types of policies go together with high-stakes testing (i.e. performance evaluations with significant effects on teachers in terms of rewards or sanctions). The assumption that this type of evaluation is desirable and will have a positive impact on students' learning¹⁰ is broadly accepted within the Bank's publications¹¹. In line with the World Bank ethos, part of the interest in performance-based incentives lies in their cost-effectiveness potential when compared to “input” measures such as the provision of teaching-learning material and/or teacher training:

“Teacher-performance pay led to significant improvements in student test scores, with no evidence of any adverse consequences of the program. Additional school inputs were also effective in raising test scores, but the teacher incentive programs were three times as cost effective” (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011a: 73).

The Bank's fascination with performance-based incentives should be read in connection with claims about the lack of effect of teachers' qualifications and experience as predictors of teaching quality and, ultimately, as guarantees of student learning. Teachers' education or years of experience are regarded as inappropriate attributes or proxies to determine teachers' remuneration. Instead, paying teachers on the basis of “proved” performance is considered to be much more appropriate:

¹⁰ In addition to improving student learning, some documents consider performance-based incentives as likely to have an impact on potential teacher candidates, motivating ‘results-driven individuals’ to enter the profession.

¹¹ Interestingly, it is also suggested that feedback on students' learning has an impact on learning outcomes only when accompanied by performance-linked bonuses: «While our results do not speak to the potential effectiveness of such feedback when combined with teacher training and targeted follow up, it does suggest that diagnostic feedback to teachers by itself may not be enough to improve student learning outcomes, especially in the absence of improved incentives to make effective use of the additional inputs» (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2010: 189).



“Researchers agree that many important aspects of teacher quality are not captured by the commonly used quality indicators such as education, experience, and subject matter knowledge” (Pandey et al., 2008: 13).

“Distinguishing high-quality teachers from low-quality teachers on all levels of competency is even more challenging; the huge variability in quality among teachers is typically not easily explained by observable indicators such as academic qualifications or experience (Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2005)” (Chang et al., 2014: 111).

“An increasing body of research shows that teacher characteristics rewarded under the status quo in most school systems (such as experience and master’s degrees in education) are poor predictors of better student outcomes (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, 2006; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain 2005; Rockoff, 2004)” (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011b: 394).

“Almost universally, teacher recruitment and promotion are based on the number of years of pre-service training, formal certificates, and years in service. Yet an extensive body of research has documented the lack of correlation between these “observable” factors and teachers’ actual effectiveness in the classroom (...) The clear implication of available research is that most school systems are recruiting and rewarding teachers for the wrong things, failing to encourage the capacities and behaviors that contribute most directly to student learning results, and unable to sanction ineffective performance” (Bruns et al., 2011: 142-143).

Although the convenience and potential of performance-based incentives emerges as quite a cross-cutting idea, it is worth noting that some of the documents show a distinctively “cautious” approach towards these sorts of schemes – or, at least, avoid absolute positions and favour a relatively critical perspective. This is particularly the case in *Incentives to Improve Teaching* (edited by Vegas, 2005). This book offers a thorough and in-depth review of different experiences of performance-based incentives in Latin America, including a chapter devoted to a literature review on the issue. Maybe not surprisingly (given the volume of reviewed evidence), the book finds mixed results in what determines the effectiveness of these schemes: “the devil is in the details” (Vegas, 2005: xiii). The book makes it clear that incentives operate as part of a broader system and, most importantly, entail important risks:

“Because teachers respond to incentives, education policymakers can improve the quality of teaching and learning by designing effective incentives that will attract, retain, and motivate highly qualified teachers. But how teacher incentives are designed—and implemented—also

matters. In various cases, teachers have been found to respond adversely to incentives by, for example, reducing collaboration among teachers themselves, excluding low-performing students from classes, cheating on or manipulating the indicator on which rewards are based, decreasing the academic rigor of classes, or “teaching to the test” to the detriment of other subjects and skills” (Vegas and Umansky, in Vegas, 2005: 4).

“(…) Merely looking at changes in the measured output, such as improvements in student test scores, may not tell the whole story of the effect of incentive reforms. More important, changes in the measured output do not necessarily correlate with changes in the desired outcome. Rather, observed and measured output changes may mask unintended effects, such as damage to assets, reallocation of effort, or manipulation of measurement indicators” (Umansky, in Vegas, 2005: 24).

The book, in fact, reviews different “failed” experiments where incentives proved unsuccessful, did not deliver their promise, or had unintended and unexpected effects (see, for instance, Chapter 6 authored by Urquiola and Vegas; or Chapter 7 by McEwan and Santibáñez). And although these findings do not preclude an essentially “optimistic” view of this policy option, it offers a distinctively “circumspect” approach.

Holding teachers accountable by **parents or communities**, and according parents or communities’ oversight of teachers is considered a recommendable policy in one-third of the documents (34.38 per cent). This policy approach usually goes together **with stronger forms of school-based management or community participation in schools**. The idea is to give more responsibilities to local committees or to school councils and, among other competences, enable them to fire and hire teachers. This is what Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos (2011) call strong forms of school-based management. Among other effects, parental control is expected to control teachers’ attendance:

“Amongst the surveyed schools, there was a clear trend that schools with FMCs [Fathers and Mothers Councils] tend to have less teacher absenteeism. Therefore, one of the proposed solutions for reducing teacher absenteeism is to have effective FMCs in schools across the country, which actively interact with teachers and school staff and monitor their activities” (WB, 2006: 52).

Again, it is important to bear in mind that some documents adopt a more “vigilant” approach to the question. The book, *Incentives to Improve Teaching* (2005) discusses three experiences with school-based management schemes conducted in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, highlighting the possibility of unexpected effects and limited impacts in areas such as student achievement, classroom processes, or teacher motivation. As the following excerpt captures:



“We need to consider another scenario where community school parents limit their oversight to the most visible aspects of teacher effort—teachers’ attendance and hours worked—without entering classrooms and instigating changes in teaching methodology and classroom management. In other words, community parent councils may not be striving to create the best schools; they may simply want the most efficient schools” (Di Gropello and Marshall, in Vegas, 2005: 355).

Similar to this form of management, a significant number of documents (25 per cent) recommend the introduction of **contract teachers** into the system. For instance, Bruns et al. (2011) note that “the evidence supports a theory of action in which the positive impacts of contract teacher reforms hinge on the de facto effectiveness of local monitoring”. Contract teachers (also known in some contexts as para-teachers) are teachers contracted on a temporary basis and usually with lower qualifications and/or training than regular teachers, whether by education authorities or by local communities. Several World Bank documents consider contract teachers as a policy option to be adopted in exceptional situations. For instance, in some documents, contract teachers are seen as a way to remedy teacher supply difficulties in remote areas:

“Recruiting local people as teachers may help to address the deployment problem. In Lesotho, where the selection of teachers is done by school management, schools are able to employ local people who are more likely to accept the post and remain in it. This results in recruitment of less-qualified teachers in rural schools but provides a stable cohort of teachers even in the most remote schools” (Mulkeen and Chen, 2008: 6).

Other documents, however, consider the use of contract teachers in a more systematic way and as an alternative to the regular teaching force (which, in many countries, enjoys civil servant status). In these cases, contract teachers are seen as a means to enhance teacher effort and accountability, as well as boost the cost-effectiveness of the system.

“The results from the paper show that in government schools, contract teachers are associated with higher effort compared to regular teachers; and higher teacher effort is associated with better student performance after controlling for other school, teacher and student characteristics (...) Contract teachers now form a sizable part of the teaching force in public elementary education in India. The evidence so far suggests that at least in the short run, contract teachers are a more efficient resource compared to regular teachers (...) By hiring contract teachers in lieu of regular teachers, the government buys the same or more learning output at a lower cost (...) teacher effort may work better than other input based policies in raising education quality” (Goyal and Pandey 2011: 11-12).

The lower levels of teacher qualifications and preparation of contract teachers are generally regarded as a lesser evil. Not coincidentally, the use of contract teachers frequently coincides with the **provision of alternative entry paths** to the teaching profession, which is recommended in 15.63 per cent of the analysed documents. These documents advocate for teacher training systems involving minimal pre-service preparation, usually in combination with additional in-service training and potentially allowing the employment of untrained teachers (or teachers holding credentials below the ordinarily required level) (see Box 2).

BOX 2. THE CASE FOR ALTERNATIVE PATHWAYS: TEACH FOR AMERICA AS A MODEL?

Many of the World Bank's documents seem predisposed to considering "alternative pathways" regarding entrance into the teaching profession. However, on the basis of the reviewed knowledge products, it remains unclear which teachers are expected to be attracted by the increasing flexibility of entry requirements. Apparently, and considering the "inspiring role" of the Teach For America model, it is assumed that more flexible requirements should allow for the entrance of *professionals* from other fields (e.g. individuals having higher education qualifications in other areas) through highly selective routes:

"A number of education systems around the world have opened their recruitment processes to individuals not formally trained as teachers. In some countries, this policy has grown out of concerns over the low academic quality of teacher education programs and a belief that individuals with higher education degrees in specific content areas may have stronger expertise than graduates from teacher education programs. A second motivation is the difficulty in finding enough conventionally trained teachers to meet specific skills needs, particularly for secondary education, math, and sciences. A third motivation is a shortage of conventionally trained teachers willing to teach in challenging environments, such as disadvantaged urban schools or in remote rural areas" (Bruns and Luque, 2014: 164).

"The Teach For America model of alternative recruitment has been spreading in Latin America since 2007, under the umbrella name of Teach For All (TFA). Programs launched in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru have demonstrated a "proof of concept": talented young graduates from top universities who were not otherwise considering a teaching career have been willing to commit to two years teaching in disadvantaged school" (Bruns and Luque, 2014: 293).

"Alternative models, which include those that do not fit into the concurrent or consecutive models, seek to attract talented individuals (usually professionals in



other disciplines) into teaching. These models typically entail a shorter period of teacher-specific education and training, during which individuals develop the qualifications required to become a teacher. In determining the education routes available to people who want to become teachers, policy makers face a trade-off between providing flexibility for the most talented individuals to enter the teaching profession, while at the same time ensuring minimal inequality in the qualifications held by teachers" (SABER-Teachers: 14).

However, in some cases, it is difficult to discern whether these flexibilisation schemes should enable the recruitment of individuals not holding (higher) education credentials. If this was the case, flexibilisation would in turn legitimise the establishment of accelerated teacher training programmes or upgrading programmes for under-qualified teachers as those found in a substantial part of the World Bank's lending projects (see next section), which is likely to have a destabilising and deprofessionalising impact. Essentially, the idea of alternative pathways seems suitable to address two competing theories of change, as suggested by Emiliana Vegas in the World Bank education blog.¹² In her post, Vegas says that *"the evidence from various programs across the world suggests that alternative pathways may help ease teacher shortages and bring into the profession individuals who are at least as effective as traditionally-trained teachers"*. However, a variety of profiles could fall into the category of individuals "not trained as traditionally-trained teachers", including:

- *"Teachers who are hired on fixed-term renewable contracts without having been professionally trained through the traditional initial teacher education programs, and who are paid much lower salaries than regular civil service teachers" (with reference to contract teachers programmes)*
- *"College graduates from all backgrounds (not necessarily education graduates) from some of the best colleges and universities in the country to teach for two years in urban and rural public schools that serve disadvantaged students" (with reference to Teach For America).*

Policies facilitating the **removal of low-performing teachers** are considered in a number of the reviewed WB documents (21.88 per cent). They include probation periods for novice teachers, performance-conditioned employment, and the formation of a separate teaching service (with a status different to civil servants', i.e. more flexible and not requiring open-ended appointments). In addition, to enable the dismissal of underperforming teachers, placing a question mark over job stability is considered to have the additional advantage of encouraging teacher effort.

¹² See <http://blogs.worldbank.org/education/are-alternative-pathways-into-teaching-bad-for-students>.

2.3.2. An (under-developed) professionalisation agenda and other policy recommendations


The improvement of **teacher training** is also a recurrent idea within the policy recommendations included in the reviewed literature. About one-third (34.38 per cent) of the documents refer to the imperative of upgrading pre-service teacher training and promoting and improving professional development in order to update teachers' skills. This includes policies that would seem to promote a modernisation or strengthening of teacher training programmes. This fits within a teachers' professionalisation agenda that goes against those policies aimed at the acceleration or flexibilisation of teacher training and/or the provision of in-service training for under-qualified teachers. However, it should be noted that most of the references lack detail regarding the design of the (renewed) training schemes, and the details that are provided vary noticeably.

Nonetheless, other policies that fit within a professionalisation agenda are much less frequently recommended. This is the case for the utilisation of more demanding criteria in the selection of candidates for teacher education programmes (recommended in 12.5 per cent of the documents). It also applies to the raising of recruitment standards via a certification process that would enable the creation of a pre-qualified teachers' pool or to a (more) selective licencing process (15.63 per cent of the publications).

Regarding efficiency related issues, the use of **hardship bonuses** is the most frequently recommended solution, mentioned by one out of five documents (18.75 per cent). Equally, **multi-grade** and multi-subject teaching is recommended in 15.63 per cent of the documents.

Finally, it is worth paying attention to policies addressing issues with a significant impact on teachers' **labour conditions and welfare**. One-fifth of the reviewed documents allude to the need for increased and/or punctual remuneration or to the protection of labour rights.

FIGURE 4 - Frequently recommended policies - Knowledge products





2.4. What do emblematic publications say?

In this section, we refer to three of the most recent and emblematic publications addressing teacher-related issues. They are *Making Schools Work*, *SABER-Teachers*, and the *2020 Education Strategy "Learning for All"*. The section tries to capture the main points addressed by these documents and the new debate directions they point to.

2.4.1. "Creating a culprit": Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos (2011) *Making Schools Work*

The focus on teacher effectiveness is likely to result in the blaming of education workers for the low levels of education quality in any given country. This attribution is evident to varying degrees in the reviewed literature, but it is particularly explicit in the book, *Making Schools Work*, authored by Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos (2011). The book argues that it is important to pay closer attention to teachers' efforts for two main reasons. First, students' learning is considered as a reliable predictor of long-term economic growth. Drawing on the work of Hanushek and Woessman (2007, 2010), the authors highlight the importance of "what students actually learn" as opposed to average years of schooling. Secondly, spending on education is reported to be only *weakly* correlated with student performance. As a consequence, issues in the service delivery chain – including what teachers do in the classroom and how – must be considered in order to explain the different levels of student learning.

In essence, it is possible to identify a displacement of attention, on the one hand, from education *access to learning* and, on the other, from *the lack of resources to service delivery failures* in Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos' book. In fact, the authors explicitly focus on "the threats to education quality that cannot be explained by lack of resources" (p. 1). Nonetheless, this new locus of attention does not simply complement an inputs-based approach, but seems to attempt to substitute it. Although the first chapter admits that "these are not the only problems facing education systems in the developing world" and that "inadequate funding may be the biggest challenge that developing countries face", the book focuses on exploring service delivery failures of an endogenous nature, and on recommending accountability reforms as the solution. This association is misleading, and contributes to a disregard for the importance and impact of other factors besides school-based determinants such as those of a socio-economic or regulatory nature.

It is also noteworthy that, in a rather reductionist move, *student learning* is equalled to *average cognitive skills* and to *students' performance in international or national standardised tests*. Similarly, learning (as opposed to *education attainment*) is also equalled to *school quality* (as opposed to *school "quantity"*, e.g., years spent at schools, access and completion).

30 The authors turns the spotlight on teachers with statements such as "the most widespread losses and abuses in education systems occur on the front lines – teachers

who are absent from their posts or who demand illegal payments for services that are legally free" (p.7). The book draws attention to teacher absenteeism and the loss of instructional time, but also to the highly variable levels of teachers' ability as the main causes of deficits in students' learning. It also makes reference to "egregious performance failures" on the part of teachers and attributes such failures to a disconnect between the incentives teachers face and their performance. Here, the authors of *Making Schools Work* problematise fixed salary schedules, lifetime tenures, and flat labour hierarchies, as well as a system of recruitment and promotion based on the number of years of pre-service training, formal certificates, and years in service. On the basis of these considerations, the authors review the available evidence and advocate for pay-for-performance programmes and contracts without guaranteed tenure. It is considered that these policies establish an adequate link between rewards and desired outcomes and are likely to incentivise teacher effort, which, the report argues, is far from being taken for granted.

These assertions are, to some extent, present in the majority of the Bank's knowledge products, but this publication is particularly noteworthy because of its emphasis on accountability failures at the teachers' level. Fundamentally, and through a reasoning that ultimately downplays the importance of access, funding, or external factors affecting students' learning, the authors makes teachers largely responsible for the limitations faced by education systems in developing countries. Moreover, the reductionist conception of teachers' motivation that informs the document is also significant. Although the authors note that "the assumption that agents work only for extrinsic (financial) rewards has come under scrutiny in both the psychology and economics literature in recent years", the rationale for the recommended policies owes much to a materialistic version of the principal-agent theory (see p. 38):

"Principal-agent' (or employer-employee) relationships are a central topic of economics and industrial relations research because while employers (principals) need employees (agents) to help achieve organizational objectives, the two parties have divergent interests. Employees want to maximize compensation and minimize effort, and employers want the opposite. (...) if the contract is structured so that agents are paid a flat rate irrespective of their level of effort or ability, or if job tenure is guaranteed irrespective of performance, it is unlikely that employees will exert additional effort or focus on doing the things that matter to the principal " (Bruns et al., 2014: 181).

2.4.2. SABER-Teachers (2012)

Teacher policies was the first policy domain addressed by the Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER), a World Bank multi-year programme envisaged for the development of a system approach to educational change. SABER develops



a conceptual and analytical framework and measurement tools for different policy domains of an education system to facilitate countries undertaking self-diagnosis and adopting the most effective policies. The all-embracing nature of the project, conceptualised as a databank and 'lender' of best practices, marks SABER as a milestone in the Bank's longstanding effort to become a knowledge bank able to define and guide worldwide education reforms (cf. Steiner-Khamsi in Gogolin et al., 2007). The SABER programme is the most genuine product of such an ambition (cf. Siqueira, 2012).¹³

SABER-Teachers is organised in a twofold structure, composed of a policy mapping section (devoted to a sort of "conceptual clarification") and a policy guidance section (which identifies goals, levers and advice on policy "prioritisation"). The document considers teacher effectiveness as a key predictor of student learning and argues for improved and adequate teacher policies. However, it is difficult to identify a clear-cut orientation in SABER-Teachers: the first component considers a number of possible approaches on teacher regulation, usually taking into account "both sides of the coin" and setting out the pros and cons of different policies. Similarly, no strong recommendations can be found in the section devoted to prioritisation, since it does not take a definite stance. Hence, the document describes a "professional autonomy" model, a "shared responsibility" model, a "career development" model, and a "performance management" model (exemplified by Finland, Shanghai, Ontario, and Singapore respectively) but does not declare an explicit preference for any of the four models¹⁴. Moreover, the "levers" to reach the identified goals consist of questions, which makes it difficult to discern which is the recommended option.

Overall, SABER-Teachers appears less prescriptive than most World Bank products, and even less than other SABER policy domains. Nonetheless, a look at the considered themes and selected goals may shed some light on SABER-Teachers' orientation. Out of the 10 policy areas reviewed in the framework, seven can be grouped in a managerial or management dimension (i.e. requirements to enter and remain in the profession, recruitment and employment, workload and autonomy, compensation, retirement,

¹³ However, there are grounds to doubt the effective continuation of the SABER-Teachers - no country reports were produced during 2014, what suggests a somewhat stagnant phase.

¹⁴ Interestingly, these four teacher policy profiles (i.e. combination of teacher policies in top systems) seem to be somewhat underused as an analytical and policy orienting tool. In fact, the SABER-Teachers Background Paper specifically dealing with the issue (*What Are the Different Profiles of Successful Teacher Policy Systems?*, authored by A.J. Ganimian and E. Vegas) cannot currently be found through the search engine in the WB open knowledge repository, but can only be accessed in draft form (dating from 2011) elsewhere in the web. [Retrieved from: http://wbfiles.worldbank.org/documents/hdn/ed/saber/supporting_doc/Background/TCH/What_Are_the_Different_Profiles_of.pdf].

monitoring of teaching quality, and school leadership). Following Ginsburg's (2012) categorisation, teachers are mainly regarded as human resources, employees, or staff members who need to be effectively managed, while only two other SABER areas regard teachers as training recipients (initial teacher preparation and professional development) and one as members of professional organisations (teacher representation and voice). Similarly, out of eight core teacher policy goals, only two focus on teacher development as professionals (preparing teachers with relevant training and experience and supporting teachers to improve instruction), while the remaining goals deal with human resource management issues (setting clear expectations for teachers, attracting the best candidates into teaching, matching teachers' skills with students' needs, leading teachers with strong principals, monitoring teaching and learning, and motivating teachers to perform).

Of particular interest are those gaps or aspects around which SABER adopts a cautious approach that prevents it from making strong recommendations given insufficient or conflicting evidence. This is the case for a broad range of themes such as subject matter knowledge vs. pedagogy training, teacher training formats, school principals' autonomy regarding teachers' employment and pay, community and parental involvement in the monitoring of teacher performance, and public school rankings as a means to motivate teacher performance.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that SABER-Teachers also refers to teachers' organisations although these actors do not play a central role in the SABER framework. The lack of evidence on the relationship between unionisation and education quality leads SABER-Teachers to exclude teacher organisations from the eight policy goals promoted in the document. As a consequence, the document does not take a clear or explicit stance on the expected contribution or role of teacher organisations. In that sense, the SABER-Teachers' collection of related country cases is far more informative. Here, teacher organisations appear as a source of concern in two of them (due to the loss of school days as a consequence of strike action). Moreover, the absence of the right to collective bargaining or freedom of association does not appear as a major concern in the SABER documents. In fact, such circumstances only gives rise to succinct comments in a rather dispassionate style:

"Jordanian teachers are not represented by teacher organizations. Teachers' right to associate was prohibited in 1994 by the Supreme Council. Both strike action and collective bargaining are illegal. However, general strike action (not limited to teacher organizations) does take place, and some teacher organizations are focused on gaining official sanction from the Ministry for their activities and demanding mandatory affiliation of teachers. Generally, teacher representatives appointed by the Ministry of Education act as interlocutors on behalf of teachers and may



express views on certain policy areas, including initial teacher education, professional development, recruitment, performance evaluations, curricula, and student assessment procedures" (SABER Jordan, 2010).

"There are 2 teacher organizations – one for primary school teachers and the other for secondary. After teacher strikes took place as teachers demanded increased pay in the mid-1990s, these organizations have played a minimal role and collective bargaining is prohibited" (SABER Djibouti, 2010).

The problems and solutions emphasised in SABER-Teachers Country Reports appear to have little in common with the issues considered by the rest of the Bank's knowledge products. Hence, absence rates and references to the lack of effort receive only limited or no attention, while the emphasis on preparation-related issues is quite noticeable. Poor teacher education, for instance, is cited by nearly 70 per cent of the country case documents, and the presence of untrained teachers and the attraction of insufficiently prepared candidates are mentioned by half of the country reports, in contrast with the more limited attention devoted to these issues by the rest of the Bank's knowledge products.

Instead of informing policy makers about the main challenges with regard to teachers, SABER-Teachers problematises the absence of adequate policies to deal with (unspecified) teacher-related issues. Apparently, the objective of SABER is not so much to identify the existence of factual problems but the absence of solutions. In a way, the prior definition of a set of policy solutions gives rise to the emergence of new problems – namely, the absence of these policy solutions. The problem seems to be the non-existence of a solution (in a sort of catch-22 situation, or circular/tautological argument).

Similarly, the SABER-Teachers Country Reports follow a particular style. In these reports, there are no data, figures, or research references about teachers' deficient contribution to the quality of education systems, inefficient deployment, or (problematic) levels of instruction. Instead, the reports emphasise the absence of policy guidelines, systems, or mechanisms necessary to deal with these issues in the countries under review. A pervasive pattern in the reports is: *"There are no policies in place to reward teacher performance with higher compensation or promotion, which may discourage highly motivated candidates from becoming teachers" (SABER Paraguay, 2012: 1); "There are untapped incentives to get teachers to work in hard-to-staff areas and to teach critical shortage subjects" (SABER Yemen, 2010: 6); "Minimum mechanisms are in place to hold teachers accountable" (SABER Egypt, 2010: 12), and so on.*

Consistent with this perspective, up to 75 per cent of the country reports address poor administrative and institutional management, poor levels of in-school supervision, and inappropriate time allocations (i.e. unspecific or inappropriate distribution of teachers' working time). And 85.7 per cent of the documents suggest the need for increased

and upgraded regulation on the part of concerned authorities, through a variety of forms, and particularly through data management systems.

In essence, SABER-Teachers and the related country reports seem to advocate for the construction of a minimal institutional structure, in contexts where the levels of administrative development are noticeably low. This approach, which needs to be contextualised within the Bank's willingness to become a knowledge bank, contributes to explaining the (apparently) tautological nature of the project – SABER is not exactly interested in actual teacher-related issues in particular contexts, but is expected to work as a clearing house of policy guidance.

As stated above, SABER-Teachers identifies four teacher policy profiles and four emblematic education systems, namely, a “professional autonomy” model (Finland), a “shared responsibility” model (Shanghai), a “career development” model (Ontario) and a “performance management” model (Singapore). The first one is considered to be the “less government-intensive” model, although education authorities are considered to play a key role in ensuring the quality of training. The shared responsibility model also grants considerable discretion to teachers, but emphasises the need for mechanisms fostering collaboration between educators. The career development model, in turn, is focused on building teachers' capacity. Finally, the performance management model is characterised by the tight control of teachers' work in the classroom and includes detailed guidelines, an emphasis on incentives and accountability mechanisms in order to address low effort and performance.

TABLE 1. REFERENCE COUNTRIES IN SABER-TEACHERS

	Number of comparison charts considering the country	% (n= 99)
JAPAN	72	72,7%
SOUTH KOREA	67	67,7%
SINGAPORE	46	46,5%
CHILE	46	46,5%
SHANGHAI	38	38,4%
NETHERLANDS	31	31,3%
NEW ZEALAND	26	26,3%
FINLAND	12	12,1%
ONTARIO	0	0,0%

In principle, all of these models are likely to offer a “roadmap towards improvement” and the selection of one profile (as a model for policy reform) should be made on



the basis of a compatibility assessment. However, a review of the “comparison charts” contained in the SABER country reports (i.e. figures comparing a given country with other systems, on the grounds of their exemplarity and/or similarity) suggests a certain preference for particular models. The most frequently referenced countries can be observed in Table 1 (above). Hence, it is evident that, among the four emblematic models, the most government-intensive profile (Singapore, representing the performance management model) is the most frequently considered. South Korea (considered a top-performing and rapidly improving education system), Japan (a top-performing system) and Chile (considered a rapidly improving system) also receive a great deal of attention. Conversely, those models with an emphasis on pre-service or in-service training (Finland and Ontario) are less frequently present.

2.4.3. The World Bank Education Strategy 2020

The World Bank Education Strategy 2020 (ES2020) is conceived as an all-embracing policy document with the purpose of influencing relevant decision-makers at a variety of levels, including borrowing countries in the Global South (middle and lower-income countries), member governments, and international organisations other than the Bank.

The ES2020’s first priority is the strengthening of education systems through an alignment of their governance, management, financing, and performance incentive mechanisms, and resting on the principle of accountability. The second priority (“Building a High-Quality Knowledge Base to Underpin Education Reforms”), in turn, reflects the Bank’s willingness to become a knowledge bank and guide education reforms accordingly.

The Strategy affirms that teacher policies are a priority, but considers that a systemic perspective is needed to design adequate and context-sensitive policy guidance. Hence, specific policy recommendations are left to the SABER, noting that SABER-Teachers has been launched as a prototype (see above). As a result, the document is particularly vague, specifically in relation to teachers. Beyond general comments on the need to ensure learning and a quality education for all “beyond access”, and a lack of incentives and accountability mechanisms, little detail is provided on the policies that are more likely to reach these goals. Moreover, and as noted by Ginsburg (2012), in contrast to the 1995 and 1999 strategies, the ES2020 does not include a section specifically addressing teachers. Similarly, teachers’ unions are conspicuous by their absence (without any single mention). More importantly, when referred to, teachers are regarded as human resources or employees, while their role as learners or agents of change is disregarded (Ginsburg, 2012).

Similar to Bruns et al. (2011) (see above), the Education Strategy 2020 strategy pays limited attention to insufficiencies in the teaching force or to the unequal distribution of teachers, and in contrast focuses on accountability measures as the main quality criterion:

"The centerpiece of the new education strategy is learning for all. This goal is to be attained not only through more investments in inputs (e.g., more trained teachers or university professors, a better curriculum, more learning materials), but also through support for institutional changes in the education system. The new strategy emphasizes the importance of aligning governance arrangements, financing, incentives, accountability mechanisms, and management tools with national educational goals" (World Bank, 2011: 46).

Consequently, the training/recruitment and adequate provision of teachers is far from a priority within the Strategy. It is also noteworthy that pedagogy and teachers' training are only mentioned in relation to a changing technological landscape: *"These technological changes can improve the quality of service delivery, but research and field experience indicate that the new technology must be accompanied by profound changes in pedagogical methods. The ability of education systems to develop "new economy skills" can help countries become more competitive (see Box 2). This implies changing the way educators are trained, increasing the supply of qualified educators, and improving the relevance of education curricula"* (ES2020: 22). According to the reviewed document, appropriate pedagogy (jointly with sufficient instruction time) is critical to develop basic skills, but no details are provided on what an appropriate pedagogy entails. Interestingly, in one of the consultations for the elaboration of the ES2020, the World Bank's head of the education division was asked what pedagogies were the best to implement, she replied: *"...there are better experts outside [the Bank] on this area [i.e. pedagogy], even UNESCO and the International Institute for Education Planning (...) This is not our comparative advantage"* (interview quotation from Verger et al, 2014: 13).

2.5. Key findings

- According to the Bank, teachers are key determiners of student learning, but the reviewed documents tend to emphasise how limited the contribution of teachers is to education quality and learning. Thus, the idea that teachers account for an important part of the low levels of learning is a pervasive one.
- This poor contribution is frequently portrayed as the result of a deliberate lack of effort, as suggested by continuous references to the intentional loss of instruction time, inactivity when in the classroom, and high absence rates. Some documents, however, dilute the degree of teachers' responsibility, considering the impact of factors beyond teachers' control such as second jobs, double-shift schemes, or illnesses (particularly HIV/AIDS).
- The preferred explanation for teachers' (presumed) deliberate under-performance is the lack of accountability structures, and, especially, the absence of performance-based incentives – uniform and equal labour conditions are perceived as harmful and demotivating.



- To a lesser extent, the inadequacy of teacher training (pre-service or professional development) and the presence of untrained teachers in the profession are also considered to be significant factors explaining poor levels of teacher performance.
- When discussing teachers' unions, the World Bank's literature tends to focus on their role as "obstacles" to necessary reform – while their positive contribution is addressed much less frequently. Policy advice on the issue focuses mainly on the deactivation or co-optation of teachers' unions in order to overcome their resistance or achieve their cooperation. In contrast, the possibility of a negotiation scheme on equal terms is not contemplated.
- Performance-based incentives emerge as a privileged policy option – being portrayed positively in nearly half of the publications. The support enjoyed by school-based management schemes and the use of contract teaches suggest also a preference for labour instability as a means of motivating teacher effort.
- Although less frequently discussed, comments on the importance of teacher training and the raising of hiring standards suggests also some consideration for a professionalisation agenda focused on the strengthening of teachers skills.

3. TEACHERS IN THE WORLD BANK'S LENDING PROJECTS

This section focuses on the main teacher-related problems addressed by the World Bank's lending projects, as well as on the policy solutions most frequently supported by these projects. Section 3.1 deals with the main teacher-related "issues" identified in the projects, and to what extent these issues represent significant obstacles to the improvement of education systems. Section 3.2 reviews the roles most frequently attributed to or expected from teachers' unions according to these projects. Finally, Section 3.3 discusses the programmes and lines of action most frequently funded through the reviewed lending activity.

3.1. Teacher-related issues to be addressed

3.1.1. Critical points: training, time, and distribution

When it comes to a general diagnosis of the education system, **limitations concerning teacher education** is the most frequently cited challenge in those World Bank lending projects with teacher components in them. Up to 52.9 per cent of the projects refer to some sort of shortcoming or deficit in teacher training, in particular its limited provision and/or low standards. Although a significant proportion of the documents contain only general remarks on this issue, other projects elaborate on it, including Project 086294¹⁵ in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which reports that:

"Existing teachers' pre-service and in-service training methods and quality do not confer sufficient professional expertise. The pre-service training of primary school teachers is mostly provided by the 4000 secondary schools which have a 3-year pedagogical stream (humanités pédagogiques) of theoretical training that follows an initial 3-year common program for all secondary school students. The quality of the humanités pédagogiques is widely seen as mediocre. On-the-job training and skill upgrading opportunities are scarce, irregular and depend mostly on donor-funded projects".

Similarly, Project 094042 in Uzbekistan remarks that:

"In recent years a number of positive changes have been taking place in the area of teachers' professional development through the work of non-governmental organizations and the support of donors and international lending institutions. But these changes have not permeated through the system due in part to lack of local capacity, but also due to approaches to

¹⁵ If not stated otherwise, the projects referred and quoted in this section correspond to the appraisal documents of the lending projects listed in Appendix 3.



staff development that rely on providing training to teachers working individually with little or no contact with other teachers in their own schools. Many MPE [Ministry of Public Education] sanctioned teachers' skills improvement programs are focused on novelties in content rather than methods. Teachers are invited to seminars on an individual basis, and incentives to schools for training teachers' teams do not exist. After attending professional development events teachers go back to their schools to work on an individual basis, concentrating on the issues related to their specific subjects".

More generally, seven broad groups of issues can be identified with regard to teacher training in World Bank lending projects:

1. Inadequate content of pre-service teacher training: teacher education is not providing teachers with the adequate pedagogical or professional expertise as a consequence of an inappropriate curriculum or learning methods. Additional issues that negatively impact the potential of teacher education include: excessively theoretical studies, a lack of attention to modern pedagogical approaches, the non-use of innovative methodologies, a lack of exposure to key contents or specific needs (ICT, textbooks, mother-tongue instruction) and the lack of adaptation to curricular reforms or a focus on detailed subject-knowledge rather than pedagogical skills.
2. Low qualification levels: pre-service teacher training offered through secondary education or short duration of pre-service training.
3. Absence of an (effective) in-service teacher training system: there are claims the opportunities for professional development are scarce due to the limited capacity of training institutions or the absence of a national system in place. In addition, there is a disconnect between in-service and pre-service training, inadequate content (modules disconnected from classroom realities or not based on identified needs), or inappropriate forms of delivery (during school time, in locations requiring travelling).
4. Poorly equipped institutions, shortages of teaching material, facilities in poor conditions.
5. Excessively autonomous pre-service and in-service teacher training institutions, weak linkages with educational authorities.
6. Teacher training excessively reliant on governmental provision.
7. Absence of incentives for professional development.

It is worth noting that teachers' training-related issues appear to enjoy a variable degree of attention in different regions. While around 70 per cent of projects in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and Central Asia refer to the limitations of teachers' education, this issue is far less considered in other regions (44.4 per cent of the East Asia Pacific projects, around 50 per cent in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and 36.7 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean). Significantly, in some of these latter

regions, there are concerns about the lack of training of practicing teachers, i.e. by the presence of unqualified teachers in the profession. Such a problem is referred in 44.4 per cent of the East Asia Pacific projects, 37 per cent of Sub-Saharan Africa projects, and 36 per cent of South Asia projects. Conversely, only 10 per cent of the projects in Europe and Central Asia mention it.

Beyond training, the level of teachers' "subject mastery" is rarely a matter of concern (being mentioned only by 8.4 per cent of the projects reviewed). However, the utilisation of outdated or inadequate pedagogical practices is referred to in one-quarter of the projects. Again, the attention devoted to this issue is far from uniform across regions: while more than 40 per cent of the European, Central Asia and East Asia Pacific projects mention the problem, the figure is halved for Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Middle East, and North Africa projects. This variable distribution, in combination with the unequal attention directed to training and teacher provision issues described below, indicates a noticeable difference in the locus of attention between those regions with a higher presence of middle-income countries (such as Latin America, Europe, and Central Asia) and those with a greater presence of low-income countries. Such a pattern suggests that "what happens in the classroom" (i.e. the pedagogic process) is only approached in World Bank projects once more basic problems such as access or teacher provision are secured, or that the possible existence of this sort of challenge is not considered by the WB in some contexts.

In addition, the comments made on the use of inadequate pedagogical practices may indicate the World Bank's preferences on pedagogic matters. The projects take a critical stance on the use of passive, frontal or teacher-centred methods (referred to as "chalk and talk"), as well as on mechanical instruction focused on memorisation and rote learning and on the limited attention to pupil interaction. The documents regret the lack of student-centred methods and the fostering of critical thinking, questioning, or problem-solving approaches. Four of the projects analysed specify these pedagogical limitations documenting an (excessively) test-oriented approach – somewhat surprising given the WB's customary promotion of standardised testing. In Mongolia, for instance, it is reported that:

"The current education culture is test-driven, with assessments not promoting improvements in teaching practice. The traditional system of education emphasizes rote learning and the ability of learners to follow instructions. National tests reinforced this focus (...) Schools are driven by an assessment culture, since student test results influence teacher salary levels" (Project 096328).

Similarly, in relation to Tanzania, Project 114866 reports how:

"Anecdotal evidence suggests that teachers are teaching to the test, rote memorization is common, and a large number of students who graduate



possess inadequate skills for entry into tertiary institutions or the labor market" (Project 114866).

In Pakistan, Project 090346 reports that "*pedagogic methods rely on rote learning and high stakes examination*", and P101243 reports that "*Teaching practices remain out-dated and are largely based on a culture of rote learning gearing students towards examination*".

Issues related to teachers' **deployment and territorial allocation** receive significant attention in the World Bank's lending portfolio; they are referenced to by 44.5 per cent of the projects and appear to be a cross-cutting issue. These documents point to teachers' shortages in disadvantaged areas (remote or rural locations, urban slums) or the concentration of less-qualified teachers in disadvantaged areas, usually highlighting the effects of such a distribution in terms of equity. Closely related, 21 per cent of the documents refer to teacher shortages, i.e. generalised high teacher-pupil ratios. In fact, in some cases, relative shortages in rural or poor areas (simultaneous to surpluses in better-off areas) are difficult to discern from **absolute shortages**. Combining both categories (jointly with the lack of specialists or critical subject shortages), 53.8 per cent of the projects refer to significant teacher shortages in a given area, whether resulting from inadequate deployment policies or from an insufficient teaching force. Similarly, the low rate of **female teachers** also receives some attention, being mentioned by 10.9 per cent of the projects¹⁶. Importantly, **provision and allocation problems** are mainly highlighted in Sub-Saharan Africa and East-Asia Pacific, where twice as many projects (nearly 90 per cent) address these issues as those in the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, Europe and Central Asia.

Thirdly, the harmful effects of **limited instruction time** (attributed to teacher absences, premature school closures, short school days) receive significant attention, as well as **teacher absences** specifically, which are mentioned by 41.2 per cent and 33.6 per cent of the projects respectively. Interestingly, and in contrast to a significant number of knowledge products, these limitations are generally dissociated from teachers' decisions: 32 out of 49 of those projects mentioning low instruction time (equivalent to 65.3 per cent) consider this problem to be (partially) explained by the impact of multiple-shift schemes, official stipulations on the length of schooldays, or the remote location of certain schools. Or they portray teacher absences as unintentional (a consequence of the school location, the impact of illnesses, or other duties such as monitoring elections). In fact, only a limited number of projects (a total of eight or 6.72 per cent)

¹⁶ However, this appears to be a problem confined to certain areas – namely, the Middle East and North Africa (referred to by one-third of the projects), followed by South Asia (19.2 per cent) and Sub-Saharan Africa (12.9 per cent). Moreover, and unlike limitations concerning the supply and distribution of available teachers, such an issue results from particular sociocultural dispositions rather than from economic constraints.

contain explicit comments that fall within a narrative of “**lack of effort**” or “neglect of responsibilities” (linking the loss of instructional time or the limited time-on-task to deliberate and unjustified decisions by teachers - premature school closures, inefficient use of time, poor lesson preparation). It is also worth noting that references to teacher absences are far from being equally distributed among geographical areas. Hence, no single reference to teacher absences can be found in Europe and Central Asia projects, and Latin American projects address it only marginally (in 13.3 per cent of the projects). Meanwhile, teachers’ non-attendance (deliberate or justified) as a relevant problem is mentioned by 68 per cent of South Asian projects and 55.6 per cent of Sub-Saharan African projects.

The limitations resulting from a weak or poorly developed **institutional infrastructure** (when it comes to managing and monitoring the teaching force) also enjoy noticeable and widespread attention in World Bank projects. Nearly one-third of the projects make some references to the lack of effectiveness of education authorities, mentioning the poor levels of institutional development, the absence of appropriate monitoring, evaluation or management mechanisms, the lack of information and detailed data on teachers’ performance or attendance, limitations concerning the inspectorate system or general comments on the poor levels of accountability, etc. In contrast with the evidence in the WB’s knowledge products, references to the harmful effects of job stability are very rare.

3.1.2. The role of accountability

The deficiencies of specific accountability mechanisms are contemplated less often. Hence, the absence of **performance-based incentives** (salary, promotions) is addressed by a limited number of projects (14.3 per cent). Usually, these projects note a lack of incentives rewarding performance or effectiveness, which is considered to demotivate teachers. For Kyrgyz Republic, for instance, P078976 notes that “*The salary structure of teachers is based largely on seniority. Because salary increases of teachers are unrelated to their performance, they provide no incentive for improving their effectiveness as teachers - particularly, in terms of what their students are learning*”.

Similarly, the following excerpts capture such an approach:

“As in most countries, teacher pay in the Philippines depends largely on a teacher’s age and qualifications. The absence of performance-related pay makes it difficult to reward top teachers. In addition, the national, non-differentiated pay scale for teachers makes it difficult to encourage teachers into “hard-to-staff” schools and subject areas and difficult to attract and retain top teachers” (Project 094063, The Philippines).

[Lack of] “*professional advancement opportunities and continuous performance appraisal and allied reward systems to ensure that teachers*



use effective classroom practices and continue to enhance their competencies throughout their teaching careers" (Project 097104, Indonesia).

"The public education system is lacking a performance-based incentives system and an effective mechanism for evaluating and upgrading the performance of the teaching staff" (Project 118187, Lebanon).

Limitations concerning **community supervision/accountability** are referenced by 10.9 per cent of the projects¹⁷ - reflecting the still limited expansion of these arrangements. These projects point to poor levels of empowerment, training and information of parents and communities. In Pakistan, for instance, Project 107300 reports that:

"Large numbers of SMCs [School Managing Committees] either did not get off the ground or became dormant over time. Some of the factors that contributed to this state-of-affairs included, limited parental participation lack of understanding of SMC roles and responsibilities, weak capacity, and little or no financial resources", and in India, Project 118445 notes that "Community-based mechanisms are a promising but recent innovation and are not yet reliable mechanisms for teacher accountability."

Related to this, some projects document the effects of **corruption** (13.4 per cent), whether in the form of rent-seeking, nepotism in hiring and deploying practices, or bribery. Significantly, this seems to be particularly the case in some settings with strong forms of School-Based Management (SBM), which appear to open the door to patronage-based recruitment or political interference in the assignment of school postings. Projects in Pakistan and Bangladesh account for more than half of the references to corruption (9 out of 16).

BOX 3. BACKFIRING EFFECTS? THE CASE FOR SCHOOL-BASED MANAGEMENT IN BANGLADESH

In Bangladesh, SBM appears to be in a particularly advanced stage. Here, a growing demand for secondary education has been met through private provision and public financial support. In fact, most secondary schools are not-for-profit institutions administered by SMCs and receive State subsidies (90 per cent of teachers' salaries, block grants for schools construction and maintenance). However, this model of school organisation faces serious issues. As reported by the majority of projects in the country, SBM seems to be particularly open to political interference and elite capture, leading to malpractice in teacher recruitment:

¹⁷ In fact, most of these references are located in South Asian projects – where strong forms of SBM have been more clearly advanced (by the WB lending activity) during the last decade.

"School managing committees (SMCs) and Governing Bodies (GBs) were supposed to play a critical role in the hiring of teachers and monitoring school performance. However, these bodies were sometimes influenced by politicians to dole out teaching jobs to unqualified relatives. This political interference led to an apparent lack of interest of genuine community members and guardians to actively participate in SMCs/GBs" (Project 102541, Bangladesh).

"Teachers in private schools were recruited directly by SMCs/GBs. While the appointment procedures were clearly laid out in government rules and regulations, the hiring system, however, was open to abuse and rent-seeking. A combination of the lack of application of standardized hiring criteria, and inadequate community/parental participation in SMCs/GBs contributed to frequent violation of hiring practices. Poorer, better-qualified applicants were overlooked in favor of candidates who could contribute to the school's finances. Pressure was also put on the school to appoint relatives of Managing Committee members/chairperson or those in powerful positions within the community" (Project 084567, Bangladesh).

"School Management Communities (with the authority to appoint, suspend, dismiss and remove teachers and ensure regular payment of teachers' salaries and to monitor school performance and teacher attendance) are often composed predominantly of male elites - e.g. members of parliament and politicians routinely chair 20-30 SMCs/GBs and often use this position for political aid favour (especially in hiring teachers)" (Project 077789, Bangladesh).

Aware of these and other irregularities, some World Bank projects support measures such as the establishment of new election rules in SMCs, the setting up of merit-based recruitment procedures, and/or the establishment of a non-governmental agency in charge of accrediting potential teachers.

"It is imperative to empower School Management Committees (SMCs) or college governing bodies (GBs), as they are the only entities that exist at the local level to monitor schools, especially on aspects related to the attendance of teachers and students, upkeep of physical infrastructure, and performance in examinations. The Regulations on Managing Committees of the Registered Non-Government Secondary Schools are being amended to ensure that only the deputy commissioners, upazila nirbahi officers, or retired government officials nominated by them, can chair SMCs/GBs, and that any particular individual (other than deputy commissioners or upazila nirbahi officers) cannot chair any more than four committees. All upcoming SMCs/GBs elections will follow these rules" (Project 077789, Bangladesh).

3.1.3. Managing a costly resource

Lending projects also address **efficiency** issues in relation to teachers. Efficiency and cost-saving measures receive considerable attention in one-third of the projects reviewed. These projects point to a range of issues considered problematic in terms of efficiency including **low teacher-student ratios** (or oversized networks of schools), **low teacher workloads**, a high proportion of **non-teaching staff**, and excessively **high wages**. Nonetheless, with regard to this last point, it is worth remarking that, while references to the proportion of education budgets allocated to teacher salaries (or salary-related expenditures) are contained in almost one-third of the projects (32.5 per cent), they are only clearly problematised in a small number of documents – a total of five or 4.7 per cent:

"Teacher salaries in Burkina Faso are 7.5 times per capita income compared to an estimated 3.5 times per capita income in other developing economies. Addressing the high cost of teachers and their inefficient use, as well as community involvement in school construction as an alternative, is absolutely essential to the ability of the GoBF [Government of Burkina Faso] to expand educational opportunities" (Project O98956, Burkina Faso).

3.1.4. The place for teachers' welfare

Elements affecting **teachers' welfare**, including low salary levels, receive a significant degree of attention: 28.6 per cent of the projects make reference to low remuneration, delayed or irregular payments, teachers' income depending on parental contributions, or to the lack of job security. In some cases, however, references to low levels of remuneration seem to be used to legitimate the introduction of performance-based incentives and/or greater salary differentiation. This is the case, for instance, with Project 107772 in Armenia or Project 078976 in the Kyrgyz Republic. In the latter, moreover, an entire section is devoted to the issue of poor teachers' labour conditions, addressing mainly the issue of low remuneration. However, the section is entitled *"Lack of teacher incentives"* and finishes with a somewhat disconnected stance on performance-based salary increases:


"A major reason for low learning achievement in rural areas is the lack of teacher incentives. Although teacher salaries in urban schools are supplemented by sizeable contributions from parents and local governments, rural teachers receive only their official salary from the state budget. Official teacher salaries - which average US\$19 per month - are low in both absolute and relative terms (...) The salary structure of teachers is based largely on seniority. Because salary increases of teachers are unrelated to their performance, they provide no incentive for improving their effectiveness as teachers - particularly in terms of what their students are learning".

3.2. What place for teachers' unions?

Given the nature of the analysed documents, it is difficult to discern a particular attitude towards or conception of teachers' unions on the basis of the World Bank lending activities. Since the projects do not exactly have a diagnostic function, the identification of "problems" is imprecise at best. Regarding teachers' unions, most of the projects only address them tangentially, usually documenting their participation in consultation processes or including them in the enumeration of relevant stakeholders in the education system in question, but without including further details.

Notwithstanding this, 35 project documents offer more detail on the role played (or expected to be played) by the unions. Of these 35, 14 documents contain some favourable comments on the role played by teachers' unions, while 22 contain rather negative comments concerning unions –and their territorial distribution is highly uneven, as shown in Figure 5.

FIGURE 5 - References to teachers' unions - Lending projects



Negative comments usually refer to teachers' unions as a barrier to the successful implementation of supported policies in the lending projects, as captured in the following excerpts:

"There may be potential opposition from stakeholders (teachers' union) in relationship to scholarships for both public and private school attendance as well as the expansion of EDUCO schools" (Project 078993, El Salvador).



"Some of the policy measures supported by DPL [Development Policy Loan] 1 might encounter resistance from powerful interest groups, such as the teachers' unions, wealthy parents, and civil servants. This is particularly so for policies to improve the efficiency of resource use and educators' accountability for student learning, delinking teacher salary increases from irrelevant and not required qualifications, phasing out subsidies to profit-making private schools, and placing all managers on time-bound performance contracts" (Project 086875, Namibia).

Several projects also refer to "unions' vested interests" and to their "corporativism" as the main reason why they try to block reform processes. In Honduras (Project 101218), for instance, unions are held responsible for the deficient or soft implementation of the incentives programme, and their strikes are considered the "main culprit for the shortened school calendar". Other reports say that:

"It is important to move towards improving relations between the teachers' union and the education authorities, eliminating perverse linkages between the two, and instituting new, results-oriented modes of interaction that are more transparent and accountable. In particular, it's important to redefine education supervision, stressing its pedagogic function over administrative and union functions" (Project 085851, Mexico).

"Corporatist pressures by unions are very strong and particularly difficult in the social services sector in which beneficiaries, such as children and their parents, often do not count on the same level of organization as service providers, such as teachers. In education, UNE (Union Nacional de Educadores), the teachers' union, is particularly strong" (Project 087831, Ecuador).

"The project does not include controversial aspects, nevertheless, the education sector is characterized by a large number of teachers' unions that defend their corporate interests and make reform implementation difficult. For example, recurrent strikes negatively impact the school year duration and the quality of learning in addition to preventing the implementation of necessary reforms. In addition, unions might oppose that the Government-set learning objectives for their classes since this might be deemed as interference in their work and autonomy. Also, the Project will implement tools to monitor teachers' absenteeism and teaching practices that may incur resistance" (Project 133333, Senegal).

Conversely, in other cases, unions are depicted in a more favourable way, with documents remarking on their positive contribution to the education system, noting their usefulness as agents to fight against corruption (Project 086294, Democratic Republic of the Congo), reliable sources of information (Project 111304, Guinea), facilitators of public forums allowing for discussions among teachers concerned by in-service teacher training (Project 120738, The Gambia), part of the entity intending

to organise in-service training (Project 126408, Uruguay), or key stakeholders in nationwide awareness campaigns building consensus on the elimination of repetition rates and introducing new assessment procedures (Project 075964, Cameroon). In some cases, unions are reported to even be aligned with educational authorities:

“Both the MEST [Ministry of Education, Science and Technology] and teachers’ unions agree that this reform should have three main goals: (i) the introduction of a consistent licensing scheme for teachers; (ii) decompression of the salary scale; and (iii) the raising of the average wage” (Project 102174, Kosovo).

“Teacher and student union representatives were particularly vocal in their support for major changes in the system” (Project 079226, Bosnia and Herzegovina).

In essence, unions are only occasionally discussed in some detail in the lending projects of the World Bank. When they are considered, they are frequently regarded as a risk or barrier to take into consideration – although their complicity or potential collaboration is celebrated.

3.3. Main policy interventions

3.3.1. “Qualifying” teachers

When Among the different policy measures stipulated or supported by the grants and loans funded by the World Bank, those addressing **teacher training** are by far the most frequently prescribed. Three-quarters (77.9 per cent) of the projects establish actions directed to strengthen, improve, or extend the provision of pre-service and in-service training. In fact, this category accommodates a noticeable variety of interventions and lines of action. Notwithstanding this, all these interventions are noticeably distinct from those oriented toward a deregulation of teacher education (accelerated training programmes, flexibilisation of entry paths). Hence, policies on teacher training include support for a strengthened or expanded pre-service teacher education, or support for in-service teacher training schemes for qualified teachers. Many of the teacher training programmes aim at improving teachers’ knowledge or skills, usually under a specified theme or with an explicit goal, such as the incorporation of a competency based curriculum, child-centred pedagogical approaches, local or foreign languages, use of ICT and learning materials, inclusive education, special needs students, context-sensitive curriculum, or delivery models, etc. It should be noted that, in this analysis, in-service teacher training schemes operating as accelerated programmes for underqualified teachers have been classified under a separate category (see below).

Given the internal diversity and the lack of detail in some projects, however, the teacher training focus of the World Bank’s lending activity does not necessarily indicate support for a teacher professionalisation agenda. A better proxy for the identification

of a professionalisation agenda could be the establishment or upward revision of recruitment standards, on the basis of professional or academic qualifications¹⁸. Up to 16.8 per cent of the projects aim at making the **entrance to the profession more selective**, setting up more stringent conditions to join the pool of teachers, or at least establishing standards that have to be attained during training (as a condition for teacher appointments or accreditation).

However, policies recommending the upward revision of requirements to enter the profession seem to be especially the case for the more deregulated education systems, such as those with significant participation by the private sector, strong forms of SBM, or a widespread use of contract teachers or community/locally hired teachers. The borrowers of these programmes are countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. In these countries, **the certification systems that the World Bank promotes aim to work as a compensatory measure** (i.e. a sort of ex-ante control to avoid highly unprepared teachers from being part of the system), **rather than as a measure to promote excellence and professionalisation**. Among other measures, these projects support the development of a merit- or test-based teacher selection criteria (in occasions with higher weightage for graduate teachers) directed to create a pool of (potential) contract teachers suitable to be contracted by communities or private schools, or the establishment of competency levels/minimum qualifications that have to be attained during pre-service teacher education for appointment as teacher.

In Bangladesh, for instance, and in light of patronage-based recruitment in non-government secondary schools managed by SMCs, Project 077789 establishes the creation of an autonomous Teachers' Registration and Certification Agency (NTRCA) to ensure a transparent recruitment procedure and avoid the selection of poorly prepared individuals as a consequence of political pressure:

"The main function of this agency will be to screen, and certify a pool of qualified teachers for non-government schools. All schools that receive an MPO [Monthly Pay Order]¹⁹ will have to recruit new teachers from the pool selected by the agency (...). The certification will be based on academic qualifications and a standardized examination conducted on an annual basis. The list of certified teachers will be published and made available to all schools. SMCs/GBs will still retain the authority and flexibility to recruit teachers, but these teachers will have to be selected from the pre-qualified pool" (Project 077789, Bangladesh).

¹⁸ Other measures, such as more selective teacher training schemes or additional classroom experience during pre-service teacher education (only if supervised and excluding probation periods and training schemes based on the direct participation), turn out to be rather marginal – being stipulated in 2.3 per cent (two projects) and 3.2 per cent (four projects) of the projects respectively. Similarly, the transfer of teacher training to higher education institutions can only be found in 1.6 per cent (two projects).

¹⁹ MPO are budgetary grants currently financing 90 per cent of the salary of the non-governmental teachers and employees of all recognised educational institutions.

Similarly, in Nepal, where teachers are hired and fired by SMCs, Project 113441 establishes that:

"Teachers will be recruited at the local level from among the licensees as per the guidelines provided by the central level. The minimum qualifications for teachers will be upgraded to higher secondary education for basic education and M.Ed. or Master's degree qualifications with relevant teacher preparation course for secondary level".

In Punjab (Pakistan), in turn, Project 102608 contemplates the development of a system for teacher accreditation, certification and licensing: *"The Project will provide support to the Government of Punjab's Technical Task Force on Teacher Certification, Licensing and Accreditation, comprising practitioners from the public and private sectors"*. Project 090346 contemplates the development of a merit-based teacher selection criteria with higher weightage for graduate teachers directed to create a pool of (potential) contract teachers.

3.3.2. The need for flexibility and the emergence of a new contract

Also in relation to teachers' preparation, but with a quite different orientation, **alternative teacher education programmes** are supported by 13.7 per cent of the projects. They include accelerated pre-service training programmes and, more frequently, on-the-job teacher training programmes for underqualified teachers already in the profession. These programmes lead to teacher certification or to their recognition as "regular" teachers. In The Gambia, for instance, Project 077903 establishes a pilot experience providing *"certification possibilities for unqualified teachers at a par with the certification of those graduating from Gambia College"*.

Another example can be found in Mali, where the World Bank's Project 093991 supports a 60-day in-service training for the certification of 3,000 community school teachers: *"About 3,000 teachers, out of the 6,600 community school teachers who are not certified, already have the academic level to become professional teachers. They will receive an accelerated training of 60 days in the teacher Training Institutes to get the teaching skills and the level to be certified. After certification their salary will be increased out of the national budget"*.

Similarly, in Indonesia, Project 097104 funds the:

"Development of a mechanism for undertaking an eligibility examination to gain accelerated access to certification. The regulations specify that teachers will be able to take a special eligibility exam, which, if they pass it, would allow them to go directly to the certification process, regardless of their current training".



In Haiti, (Project 106621) outlines that:

"To respond to immediate needs and create the 'quick wins' that are a priority of the Government of Haiti and the Bank, new teachers would begin teaching only one year after entering teacher preparation, as opposed to the current three year lag (...) recent high school graduates would be selected for three years of teacher preparation, consisting of ten months in selected public and non-public IFM [Instituts de Formation des Maîtres]²⁰ and two years of full time practice teaching in K-6 classrooms".

And from Malawi's Project114847:

"ODL [Open Distance Learning program] student teachers are recruited from rural underserved communities. Entry qualification for ODL students are slightly lower as they need a pass in the English examination of the Malawi school certificate of education rather than the credit required of those undertaking the more conventional course. After a short induction course, ODL teachers will be recruited into schools and learn on the job. They will work in rural schools with poor teacher pupil ratios".

In fact, these alternative teacher training programmes are closely connected to the flexibilisation of entry paths heavily emphasised in some of the World Bank knowledge products. In contrast to those versions of flexibilisation relying on the attraction of skilled professionals, the alternative pathways identified in the reviewed lending projects appear to encourage or perpetuate the recruitment of local underqualified teachers, usually in underserved areas or regions with an already high presence of uncertified teachers in the profession (and closely connected to the recruitment of contract teachers or para-teachers). Conversely, the establishment of more orthodox versions of flexibilisation (i.e. directed to attract individuals trained in other disciplines, a la programmes like Teach For America) was only outlined explicitly in a single project:

"A 12 months pre-service training will be offered to bachelor degree holders who have the potential to teach specialized subjects in FDS [Full Day Schooling] schools. IT courses will be offered following the IT modules developed by PDTP [Primary Teacher Development Project]" (Project 091747, Vietnam).

Also falling within a deregulation agenda, strong forms of **SBM with teachers' accountability mechanisms** appear with some frequency within the World Bank's lending projects. In this study, the authors have only considered those SBM schemes involving some form of community or school councils' control over teachers (i.e. monitoring teachers' performance and/or attendance, or taking staffing decisions).

²⁰ In English, Teacher Preparation Institutes.

These measures are stipulated in 19.1 per cent of the projects. Frequently, SBM projects involve the use of contract teachers – particularly when school or community councils are made responsible for hiring and firing decisions.

Overall, 17.6 per cent of the projects support the use of **contract teachers**, para-teachers, community teachers or, more generally, teachers with a status different from civil servants (employed on a temporary basis, whether by education authorities or by school or local committees). Frequently, these schemes dovetail with the promotion of SBM arrangements, and seem to be particularly advanced in South Asia. The percentage of projects supporting the use of contract teachers rises to 48.3 per cent in South Asia. Up to 62.1 per cent of the projects in the region establish or reinforce mechanisms making teachers accountable to parents or communities (see Box 4 below). Conversely, in other regions, these types of schemes are supported by a very marginal number of the projects.

BOX 4. TEACHERS WITHIN THE NEPALI SBM REGIME

When it comes to strong forms of SBM and the use of contract teachers as part of a deregulation agenda, Nepali projects appear to work as flagship operations, being one setting where the World Bank has most actively promoted the consolidation of these reforms since the early 2000s. The advancement of SBM has to be understood as the consolidation of a previously established reform - the passing of the Seventh Amendment of the Education Act in 2001. The approved legislation contained provisions for the formation of school management committees responsible for hiring teachers. And the conversion of aided primary schools to Community Managed Schools was incentivised by means of financial grants and the guarantee of continued government funding. Such a model involves the use of salary grants, whereby teachers are no longer supplied by the government but recruited by the communities. The lending projects reviewed here reinforce and strengthen these reforms, enhancing the management capacity of SMCs, consolidating a strong model of SBM to which the World Bank attaches great value: *"This reform, which has no precedence worldwide, constitutes one of the most radical reforms in school education aimed at addressing poor governance of public schools widespread in many developing countries"* (Project 107558, Nepal).

In some settings, the World Bank does not actively promote the use of contract teachers, but seems to consider them as a natural and even genuine component of education systems, and legitimates their presence through its interventions. In Madagascar, for instance, one of the components of Project 131945 is a subsidy for community teachers. The rationale is as follows:



"This activity will contribute to the payment of salaries for community, non-civil servant teachers—those supported through the Parent Association (Fikambanan'ny Ray Aman-drenin'ny Mpianatra, FRAM)—for a limited number of months of the year. The government has been subsidizing the salaries of these teachers since 2002 to reduce the direct costs of education to families. Since the crisis, it has been a challenge for the government to continue paying the subsidy on a timely and regular basis, and the gaps had to be filled by parents' contributions. To ensure the continued functioning of the system, while at the same time protecting future sustainability and government commitment for teacher salaries, donors have been contributing to the payment of these salaries for a limited number of months during the year, while the government assured the payment for the remaining months."

Hence, the project funds the contracting of non-civil servant and untrained teachers, hired by the communities (as a means to address teacher shortages) and with the explicit objective of preserving a particularly fragile form of education provision. Similarly, in Malawi, Project 114847 followed a similar rationale and determines that "school communities will be allowed to recruit sufficiently qualified auxiliary teachers from the local community".

These examples show that support for community teachers cannot be automatically equalled to a deliberate strategy to promote contract or temporary teachers as part of these World Bank projects. Rather, the projects seem to assume the current state of affairs (the recruitment of non-civil servant, additional teachers by communities) and provide the funds that grant their continuation. Nonetheless, the naturalisation, acceptance, and recognition of these teachers' corps (and the preservation of their use as an alternative to regular provision) implicitly contributes to the de-professionalisation and the deregulation of teachers' working conditions.

Performance-based incentives (including bonuses, a widening of salary scales or performance-dependent career advancement opportunities) are only moderately promoted within the World Bank's lending activity. Stipulated by 16.8 per cent of the projects, incentives are encouraged in particular in East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia, where more than one-third of the projects set up some kind of performance-based rewards²¹. Bangladesh is a special case where government subsidies for teachers' salaries in privately managed secondary schools are linked to performance criteria (consisting of students' results on standardised tests) within a funding scheme known as MPO (see Footnote 19).

²¹ Again, this category involves a high level of internal diversity (who is evaluated - teachers, schools, the nature of the incentive and what is rewarded). Remarkably, although in most of the cases, these incentives are expected to be managed by education authorities (involving a reform of salary scales or promotion procedures), community councils are made responsible for the administration of the bonuses (see, for instance, Pakistan Project 094086).

“The MPO system is being revised to clearly link subventions for teachers’ salaries to outcomes on standardized examinations for grades 10 and 12 (...) It is being proposed that poorly performing schools (with less than 40 per cent students passing standardized examinations in grades 10 and 12) will be given a two-year period in which to improve their performance, failing which the subventions will cease. Well performing schools (with greater than 75 percent passing in standardized examinations) will have their subventions increased by 20 percent for the next two years” (Project 077789, Bangladesh).

It is worth noting the dissimilar promotion of different policies within the different regions, as shown in Figure 6. More specifically, the advancement of contract teachers, SBM and performance-based incentives in South Asia is remarkable compared to other regions. As observed in Figures 6, 7, and 8 below, the region accounts for a very significant number of lending projects supporting these types of arrangements.

FIGURE 6 Lending projects supporting the use of contract teachers- Distribution by region




FIGURE 7 Lending projects supporting school-based management schemes- Distribution by region




FIGURE 8 Lending projects supporting performance - based incentives - Distribution by region





FIGURE 9 - Lending projects supporting contract teachers, SBM and performance-based incentives- Percentages by region



BOX 5. WATCHING TEACHERS

The establishment of supervision and management systems is a sort of cross-cutting measure, supported by 57.3 per cent of the projects. The specific activities supported as part of these arrangements are quite varied in nature and include the establishment of education management cadres, the construction of a teacher database, the implementation of a teacher appraisal system and the strengthening of inspectorate services. However, besides capacity building activities, some projects support more innovative and controlling arrangements. This is particularly the case with Project 125958 in Pakistan. In light of the “underperformance of service delivery agents”, portrayed as a major concern, the project supports government plans to establish “*the piloting of the use of ICT, specifically the use of smartphones with GPS tracking capability and digital cameras for the real-time verification of the presence of teachers at school*”. Albeit rather anecdotal, it is worth taking into consideration the prior experimentation with similar schemes, as in the work of Duflo, Hanna and Ryan (2007, 2008, 2010) on attendance-based bonuses involving the use of daily and time-stamped photographs to monitor teacher attendance (jointly with random inspections). The study enjoys significant diffusion and reference, being reviewed by Rogers and Vegas (2009), Lockheed (2014), SABER-Teachers and Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos (2011) – which makes it likely to inspire future interventions.

Finally, the provision and distribution of teachers also appears to be the focus of a number of projects. Hence, different (State-managed)²² **deployment policies**, including hardship bonuses, incentives to teach particular subjects, revisions of transfer criteria, or new criteria for teacher allocation are frequently supported. Specifically, these policies are supported in 16.8 per cent of the projects. More broadly speaking, supply issues (i.e. the recruitment of additional teachers or the provision of substitute teachers) are addressed in 19.18 per cent of the projects. It is worth noting, however, that similar to other policies discussed above, most of these projects are concentrated in the South Asia region, which account for half of the projects setting up these kinds of arrangements. Since the use of contract teachers and strong forms of SBM are particularly advanced in this region, the expansion of the teaching force seems likely to entail its reshaping – marking a departure from the prevalence of civil servant status to new free-market or deregulated schemes.

3.4. Key findings

- The World Bank's lending projects devote a great deal of attention to the limitations of teacher training schemes in place. Here, issues related to professional development and preparation are clearly considered the most urgent point that need to be addressed.
- Limited instruction time also emerges as a central issue. However, and in contrast to knowledge products, this is frequently portrayed as the result of elements beyond teachers' control, such as multiple shift schemes.
- The lack of accountability mechanisms such as performance-based incentives and community supervision receive limited attention. Moreover, references to these issues appear concentrated in some particular regions.
- Teachers' unions are rarely discussed in depth in lending project documents. When addressed, however, they tend to be portrayed as obstacles or factors of risk – although their positive contribution is also contemplated.
- Most of the projects fund some sort of activity directed at improving teacher training. However, more sophisticated professionalisation measures enjoy a rather limited attention.
- Lines of action favouring the alteration of contractual relationships (SBM, contract teachers, and performance-based incentives) enjoy limited support and are especially present in the South Asian region's operations.

²² The authors do not consider here the support of strong forms of SBM or the use of contract teachers – although such policies are frequently reported to contribute to a better distribution of the teaching force.



4. CONCLUSIONS

4.1. Depiction of teachers in the knowledge products

The World Bank considers teachers as a very important piece in the quality education puzzle and, at the same time, says there is significant room for improvement. In the articles, reports, and other publications produced by the World Bank since 2000, teachers are depicted as a puzzling and problematic entity in educational settings. The main conceptions of teachers and teachers'-related problems identified in this review can be categorised as follows:

- The *low-quality culprit*: World Bank literature frequently portrays teachers as part of the problem concerning quality education that many countries face. Specifically, it considers teachers as poor contributors to the quality of education systems, and holds them responsible for low levels of student learning. This is the case in one out of three of the knowledge products analysed.
- The *low-effort absentee*: Teachers are frequently conceived as rather neglectful or disinclined to work. Half of the reviewed knowledge products consider that teachers' perceived lack of effort and engagement in the classroom, voluntary absenteeism, or the intentional loss of instruction time are key reasons for low education quality. Nonetheless, the degree of teachers' responsibility for poor performance and non-attendance is somewhat offset in one-third of the documents, which refer to the impact of illness-related issues, second jobs resulting from low salaries, or double-shift schemes.
- The *unaccountable bureaucrat*: The deliberate negligence or intentional under-performance of teachers is frequently attributed to a lack of accountability mechanisms. Four of every ten reviewed documents (43.8 per cent) allude to the harmful effects of a lack of performance-based incentives and uniform labour conditions for teachers. Among other effects, it is assumed that the lack of incentive systems in place is highly demotivating for teachers. Furthermore, one-quarter of the documents draw attention to limited opportunities for parents, schools, and local communities to voice their concerns with regard to teachers' misbehaviour.
- *Ill-prepared and untrained*: Both the presence of untrained teachers and insufficient or poor quality teachers' preparation are mentioned by nearly one-quarter of the documents. Nonetheless, in knowledge products, limitations of teacher training receive some degree of attention, but to a lesser extent than accountability related explanations.
- *Teachers' unions as reform obstacles*: Teachers' unions receive only limited attention. They are mentioned in half of the documents, but frequently as a secondary actor.

However, when discussed in some detail, teachers' unions are portrayed as obstacles to education reform processes and, consequently, as opposed to public interest.

The policy recommendations affecting teachers that are placed at the centre of the World Bank's publications are closely related to the main problems and conceptions of teachers detailed above. They are:

- Performance-based incentives: This is the most frequently recommended policy option, being promoted in half of the publications. Incentives schemes are expected to motivate teachers and are regarded as a particularly cost-effective reform – especially when compared to input measures such as increased teacher training.
- Preference for precarious labour conditions: Both the use of contract teachers and the implementation of SBM schemes involving a significant degree of control on staffing related-decisions enjoy noticeable support in the World Bank's knowledge products, with contract teachers recommended by 22.6 per cent of the documents and SBM schemes by 34.38 per cent. Similarly, policies facilitating dismissals are also considered by one-quarter of the documents. Ultimately, further job insecurity is also expected to work as a powerful incentive for teachers.
- On a separate note, the improvement of teacher training is also a recurrent recommendation (it appears in one-third of the documents). Although other policies indicative of a professionalisation agenda, such as the raising of hiring standards, are present in some documents, they are less frequently recommended by the World Bank.

4.2. Treatment of teachers in lending projects

In a similar way to the World Bank's publications, the lending projects of this international organisation identify various teacher related issues, although not all of them receive the same attention. The most frequently cited issues are:

- Challenges to teaching are at the centre of the World Bank's lending projects. Limitations affecting teachers' training are mentioned by 52.9 per cent of the projects. These include the inadequate content of teacher education, the scarcity of opportunities for professional development, and poorly equipped institutions. In the same vein, the presence of underqualified teachers in the profession also receives attention, jointly with the use of inadequate or obsolete pedagogical practices (referred to respectively in 27.7% and 29.4% of the documents).
- Pedagogical issues are also very present in the Bank's lending portfolio. Nonetheless, these issues are more frequently discussed in relation to middle-income and emerging economies (Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific), suggesting that teaching and learning dimensions are more often addressed where supply and access issues are considered to be already tackled.




- The impact of limited instruction time (as a result of short school days, premature school closures and teacher non-attendance, *inter alia*) is frequently mentioned (referred to in 41.2 per cent of the lending projects). More specifically, teacher absenteeism also receives a significant degree of attention (mentioned by 33.6 per cent of the projects). However, 65.3 per cent of those projects mentioning limited instruction time explain these limitations, to some extent, as a consequence of multiple shift schemes, involuntary absences, or other factors that tend to dissociate the problem from teachers' effort or misbehaviour.
- When it comes to teacher accountability and management, limitations resulting from a poorly developed institutional infrastructure receive significant attention (31.1 per cent), while references to the negative effects of job stability, in contrast to the knowledge projects, are hardly mentioned. The absence or limitations of performance-based incentives and community supervision receive only limited attention (14.35 per cent and 10.9 per cent respectively).
- Corruption in hiring and deployment practices is mentioned by a limited number of projects (13.4 per cent). However, such an issue seems to affect particularly those countries where strong forms of SBM and contract teachers' reforms are at a more advanced stage (such as Bangladesh and Pakistan).
- Teachers' unions are only addressed tangentially and are very rarely discussed in depth within lending projects. However, they are frequently regarded in negative terms or at least as a risk factor to take into account when implementing a project involving educational reform (22 out of 35 references point in this direction, i.e. 68.9 per cent of the projects discussing unions). The potential positive contribution of teachers' unions is mentioned less frequently, but it is also taken into account quite often (14 projects – 40 per cent).

The World Bank's lending projects analysed here aim to address one or more of the teachers'-related issues just mentioned. The main policies and programmes advanced for this purpose, by order of importance, include:

- Professional teacher training: Activities directed to improve teacher training are contemplated by most of the projects (77.9 per cent). Conversely, other professionalisation measures such as the upward revision of hiring or certification standards are less frequently stipulated (16.8 per cent), and seem to be particularly mentioned in relation to deregulated education systems.
- Contract teachers: Alternative training programmes (accelerated pre-service education or on-the-job training for unqualified teachers) are also recommended by some projects (13.7 per cent), while the flexibilisation of entry paths to the profession as envisaged by knowledge products (e.g. relying on professionals trained in other disciplines) is only marginally approached.

- School-based management: The implementation of strong forms of SBM and contract teachers are supported by a relatively limited number of projects (19.1 per cent and 17.6 per cent respectively). However, those arrangements are distinctly promoted in South Asia, where SBM receives support in 48.3 per cent of projects with contract teachers receiving support in 62.1 per cent of projects, as shown in Figure 10.

FIGURE 10 - Frequently supported policies - Lending projects
Percentages by region



4.3. Conceptions of general teacher policy: a comparative analysis

Looking at the teacher conceptions and policy preferences found in both the publications and projects of the World Bank, it becomes evident that the different types of documents offer varying points of view on the same teachers'-related themes and are informed by different perspectives, ultimately advocating for different (and even opposing) policy options. Hence, it is possible to identify significant inconsistencies in the diagnosis included in knowledge products and lending projects, as well as in relation to the policy agendas fostered by these two groups of documents²³. Figures 8, 9 and 10 illustrate these differences well:

²³ Beyond the gap between knowledge products and lending projects, it is also worth noting that each of these two genres show their own internal inconsistencies as a consequence of the “internal diversity” among the pool of researchers and employees of the Bank. Far from constituting a unitary or monolithic body of research, the different documents focus on a number of issues quite diverse in nature and, more importantly, adopt different points of view on the same themes and are informed by different perspectives, eventually advocating for different (and ever competing) policy options. However, and as recalled by Steiner-Khamsi (2012: 4) a systems theory based approach reiterates the need to think of the Bank as a social system with its own regulatory regime and a set of shared beliefs and preferences. Needless to say, it does not follow from this approach that all the researchers or WB officials align themselves with a common frame of reference.

FIGURE 11

**Frequently discussed teacher-related issues - 1
Knowledge products (KP) v. Lending projects (LP)**




FIGURE 12

**Frequently discussed teacher-related issues - 2
Knowledge products (KP) v. Lending projects (LP)**




FIGURE 13

**Frequently promoted teacher policies
Knowledge products (KP) v. Lending projects (LP)**





FIGURE 14 - Most frequently reported teacher-related issues



In fact, and taking note of the four competing teacher policy agendas advanced in the *Introduction*, a manifest disconnect between talk and action emerges within knowledge products and lending projects. On the one hand, and as Figure 13 and, particularly, Figure 15 show, knowledge products seem to express a certain preference for managerialist or neo-bureaucratic reforms, in coherence with a diagnosis of teachers' issues that emphasises their lack of effort. Following Le Grand's (2003) theorisation of public servant attitudes, teachers would very much resemble "knaves" – self-interested individuals who are unlikely to "work hard" and are not driven by genuine altruistic motivations neither concerned with students' learning nor future opportunities. These premises, in fact, fit within a principal-agent model²⁴ that explicitly informs several of the reviewed documents. Thus, knowledge products show a clear preference for those policies designed to incentivise a (more) striving attitude among teachers. In a way, these documents seem to assume that effectiveness is a question of "motivation" and that underperformance can be explained by excessive labour security and uniform conditions – which ultimately would foment idle attitudes.


Conversely, lending projects seem to be more supportive of a professionalisation agenda and place greater importance on activities aimed at improving teachers' training. Since such documents assume that the source of the problem is not the lack of effort but the inadequacy or scarcity of teacher training, the logical solution lies in the strengthening of the skills of the teaching force. Moreover, lending projects are characterised by a distinct approach that tends to dissociate quality limitations from teachers' decisions or attitudes – limited teacher time, for instance, is not portrayed as a consequence of voluntary absenteeism but as the result of factors beyond teachers' control. Furthermore, whereas the absence of accountability mechanisms is underscored by a significant number of the knowledge products, and job stability is frequently regarded as harmful,

²⁴ In a public service provision framework, the principal-agent problem refers to the difficulties met by the State (principal) when it comes to monitor public services providers (agents) and ensure they deliver the expected outcomes, as a consequence of different factors, including asymmetric information, conflict of interests, etc.

such an approach is less frequent in lending projects. Differences in the set starting premises also explain the divergence of approaches to “alternative pathways” to the profession. For instance, contract teachers are related to premises that say that teachers’ underperformance is a consequence of a “relaxed” attitudes that can be altered by less job security. However, this is not the predominant perspective in lending products.

Particularly illustrative of this gap between talk and action is how teachers are linked to educational problems in each type of document. Whereas knowledge products tend to portray teachers as part of the problem to be solved (low levels of student learning or, more generally, poor education quality), lending projects devote more attention to teachers as agents that are part of the solution to the most significant educational problems.

FIGURE 15 - Frequently supported teacher policies



This gap between what the World Bank “says” (in publications) and what the World Bank “does” (in lending projects) has already been identified in relation to other education policy areas such as education privatisation. According to Mundy and Menashy (2014: 421), despite the World Bank being one of the most active promoters of education privatisation through its publications, research and international seminars, “only seven of the countries receiving Bank lending for K-12 education have projects that include a component of funding for private provision of services”²⁵. This policy-practice decoupling is similar to the evidence in relation to teachers’ policies. In this case, the World Bank discourse can also be considered as more “neoliberal” (i.e. closer to a teachers’ flexibilisation and/or cost-efficiency agenda) than its interventions on the ground (with many projects including elements that could be considered as closer to a professionalisation agenda). It is paradigmatic of this decoupling that numerous lending projects with teachers’ components try to reverse the implementation of SBM policies (due to the perverse effects and misbehaviour that this policy has generated in real situations), despite this being a prevalent policy concept in the World Bank’s discourse.

²⁵ They reached this conclusion after analysing the Bank’s 53 education projects in K-12 in the period 2008-2012.

This and other disconnections between talk, decisions, and actions in the Bank need to be seen as a functional response as this organisation attempts to manage conflicting external agendas arising from the demands of client governments, and the internal institutional preferences reproduced by Bank officials (Mundy and Verger 2015). Thus, it is feasible to consider that many of the World Bank's clients might be reluctant to adopt the sort of managerial policies on teachers designed by the Bank's experts in Washington DC because they know that the nature of the problems of their teachers' force is of a very different nature. To many developing countries, it is probably more urgent, realistic and politically rewarding to invest their scarce resources in training and attracting a higher number of qualified teachers to their education systems. This is preferable to implementing, for instance, sophisticated incentive schemes for teachers or potentially contentious accountability mechanisms involving the community or other types of stakeholders to control teachers' labour.

Overall, considering the decline in the demand of the WB education sector lending (Jones, 2006) and the need for a diversification of borrowing countries (with an increasing presence of middle-income countries with a more discriminating attitude, but also countries that are very different in terms of development trajectories, political realities and conflict situations), it is possible to think that the Bank could now be more inclined to respond to their client priorities, and more reluctant to impose a blueprinted neoliberal agenda which, on many occasions, is far from falling within their clients' preferences. In short, the increasing diversification of clients' characteristics and needs together with the fact that the WB's lending activity is increasingly client-driven may explain the discarding of controversial policy options privileged in its knowledge products. As observed previously by Mundy and Verger (2015):

"Some aspects of the agenda have clearly been rejected by borrowers and (often after civil society contestation) by some powerful members (...) Clearly, borrowing governments play an important role in conditioning the character of Bank activities, and their preferences are at least partly responsible for disjunctures between the Bank's agenda-setting role and its practical engagement in the financing of educational development" (Mundy and Verger 2015: 16-17).

It is also possible to think that the lack of a technical capacity and institutional infrastructure (i.e. inspectorate services in place, trained officials, an operative communication and administration network, etc.) that is evident in most low-income countries where the Bank operates makes impracticable the implementation of complex managerialist and accountability systems involving a broad range of educational stakeholders,. As recently observed by the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank (IEG), the increasing degree of complexity in education projects' design in relation to the level of borrowers' political commitment and capacity creates significant problems in implementation and therefore in the delivery of results (IEG, 2011). In other words, material and technical limitations could shift the order of priorities of the World Bank's operations on the ground and make not only the clients but also Bank



officials operating in different regions sceptical of the feasibility of the often complex policies designed by the WB intelligentsia from the Washington DC headquarters. In spite of existing discordances between the knowledge and the lending products, the review of the whole corpus of documents allows for the identification of some general trends or cross-cutting assumptions. First of all, the perspective adopted by a number of documents regarding teachers' unions is particularly remarkable. When addressed with a certain depth, unions tend to be regarded in quite negative terms (as an antagonistic force to educational reform and progress) or, alternatively, as organisations appreciated only on condition of displaying a cooperative and compliant (docile) attitude. Only rarely are they regarded as equal interlocutors with legitimate policy preferences and likely to contribute to education quality on their own terms – and not as collaborators and agents open to “tolerating” education reforms.

As another cross-cutting trend, it is noteworthy that teachers are primarily conceived of as (human) resources, which accounts for the emphasis on the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed educational reforms. Pervasive references to and concern about the proportion of the education budget allocated to teacher salaries can be similarly found in the two sets of documents. This is quite paradoxical if it is taken into account that references to low salaries – and/or delayed pay – for teachers is a recurrent issue in the Bank publications and in its lending projects (see Figure 11). However, and although low or delayed salaries receive some attention, the issue is rarely addressed in a consistent way through policy proposals.

In fact, the existence of these second-order or overlooked questions underlines the importance of what is disregarded and omitted. Beyond the actual positioning of the Bank regarding a particular subject, the very “investigation questions” and the definition of the research agenda are quite informative of the priorities and orientation of the organisation. It is significant, for instance, that teachers' welfare tends to be an issue that is neglected from both the World Bank policy agenda and its operational practices. Similarly, it is quite revealing that knowledge products rarely elaborate on teacher training or discuss the issue in some depth.

Finally, it is worth noting that the results suggest an important degree of regional variation. Particularly in what concerns lending projects, regional divisions appear to behave quite differently – not only in respect to the “diagnosis of the problems”²⁶ but also regarding the main policy prescriptions. The most telling example of this dissimilarity in policy preferences is the promotion of contract teachers, SBM, and performance-based incentives, which seems to be particularly relevant in the South-Asian region, but not so much in other regions. Likewise, the approach to teachers' unions varies noticeably among different regions. Here, Sub-Saharan teachers' unions appear to be the object of an (exceptionally) positive and benevolent perspective on behalf of the Bank due to the potential role they can play in the implementation of educational reforms. Available evidence on this and other related themes is limited yet but indicates possible avenues for further empirical research and invites researchers to work further on this important matter.

²⁶ At the end of the day, diversity concerning “problems to be solved” is an expectable result given the (already discussed) growing diversity in terms of development trajectories of the borrowing countries.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Synthesis Matrix

Table A.1. Knowledge products

	SABER-Teachers Country Cases (TCC)	% of SABER-TCC	Total amount (SABER-T excluded)	% of KP (SABER-T excluded)
Teacher-related issues				
High absence rates	2	12,5	24	75,00
Lack of effort	0	0	15	46,88
"Extenuating circumstances"	3	18,75	11	34,38
Inadequate in-school supervision	9	56,25	5	15,63
Poor community or parental supervision	0	0	9	28,13
Poor administrative or institutional management	12	75	7	21,88
Absence of incentives and permanent tenure	11	68,75	14	43,75
Poor teacher education	11	68,75	8	25,00
Unqualified teachers	8	50	9	28,13
Attraction of less-prepared candidates	8	50	7	21,88
Inadequate pedagogical practices and weak subject knowledge	1	6,25	4	12,50
Critical subject shortages	14	87,5	2	6,25
Lack of female teachers	2	12,5	4	12,50
Uneven distribution	15	93,75	7	21,88
Teacher shortages	5	31,25	7	21,88
Proportion of education budgets allocated to teacher salaries	0	0	11	34,38
Inefficient use of resources	1	6,25	7	21,88
Corruption	0	0	5	18,76
Inadequate labour conditions	3	18,75	10	31,25
Policy solutions				
Improved training	5	71,43	11	34,38
More selective teacher training	2	28,57	4	12,50
Extended classroom experience	2	28,57	5	15,63
Peer-to-peer support and networking	2	28,57	7	21,88
Raising hiring standards	0	0,00	5	15,63
Contract teachers	0	0,00	8	25,00
Alternative entries to the profession	2	28,57	5	15,63
School-based management and community control	0	0,00	11	34,38
Policies facilitating dismissals	2	28,57	7	21,88
Performance-based incentives	5	71,43	16	50,00
Institutional development and capacity building	6	85,71	9	28,13
Empowered school principals	0	0,00	7	21,88
Deployment policies: hardship bonuses	5	71,43	6	18,75
Increased teacher/student ratio	0	0,00	3	9,38
Multigrade teaching	0	0,00	5	15,63
Teachers welfare	1	14,29	6	18,75
Additional recruitment	1	14,29	4	12,50
Female teachers	0	0,00	2	6,25
Revision of time allocations	3	42,86	2	6,25

Table A.2. Lending products

	Total	% (131 LP)	% EAP (11 LP)	% ECA (19 LP)	% LAC (31 LP)	% MNA (10LP)	% SAS (29 LP)	% SSA (31 LP)
Teacher-related issues								
References to low instructional time	49	41,2	66,7	5,6	23,3	40,0	68,0	51,9
>> References to teacher absences	40	33,6	22,2	0,0	13,3	40,0	68,0	48,1
>> Extenuating circumstances explaining limited instructional time	32	26,9	66,7	5,6	20,0	10,0	32,0	37,0
Limitations concerning teacher education	63	52,9	44,4	72,2	36,7	70,0	52,0	55,6
Presence of underqualified teachers	33	27,7	44,4	5,6	26,7	10,0	36,0	37,0
Inadequate or obsolete pedagogical practices	35	29,4	44,4	44,4	26,7	20,0	24,0	25,9
Weak subject matter knowledge	10	8,4	11,1	0,0	13,3	0,0	0,0	18,5
Poor community supervision	13	10,9	0,0	0,0	6,7	0,0	44,0	0,0
Absent or ineffective performance-based incentives	17	14,3	33,3	22,2	10,0	10,0	24,0	0,0
Ineffective government monitoring, poor institutional development	37	31,1	11,1	11,1	16,7	40,0	60,0	37,0
Corruption affecting teachers management	16	13,4	0,0	5,6	6,7	0,0	36,0	14,8
Relative importance of salary-related expenditures (mention of)	42	35,3	44,4	55,6	16,7	50,0	32,0	37,0
Inefficient use of resources: low ratios or workloads, high salaries, etc.	31	26,1	44,4	61,1	10,0	40,0	0,0	33,3
Absolute or relative teacher shortages (including specialist teachers)	64	53,8	88,9	27,8	36,7	40,0	48,0	88,9
>> Uneven and inadequate distribution of teachers	53	44,5	88,9	33,3	23,3	40,0	32,0	74,1
>> Absolute shortages, high ratios	25	21,0	11,1	5,6	13,3	0,0	32,0	40,7
>> Critical subject shortages or lack of specialists	15	12,6	11,1	11,1	3,3	0,0	16,0	25,9
Lack of female teachers	15	12,6	11,1	0,0	0,0	30,0	20,0	22,2
Better-educated individuals not attracted by the profession	14	11,8	11,1	27,8	0,0	0,0	12,0	18,5
Low or irregular pay or poor labour protection	34	28,6	44,4	55,6	13,3	0,0	20,0	40,7
>> Salaries depending on parental/community contributions	9	7,6	0,0	5,6	3,3	0,0	0,0	25,9
	Total	% (131 LP)	% EAP (11 LP)	% ECA (19 LP)	% LAC (31 LP)	% MNA (10LP)	% SAS (29 LP)	% SSA (31 LP)
Policy solutions								
Extended or improved teacher training	102	77,9	72,7	84,2	77,4	90,0	75,9	74,2
More selective teacher training	3	2,3	0,0	0,0	3,2	0,0	3,4	3,2
Extended classroom experience during teacher training	4	3,1	9,1	0,0	3,2	0,0	0,0	6,5
Transfer of teacher training to higher education institutions	2	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	20,0	0,0	0,0
Upward revision of certification process or hiring standards	22	16,8	9,1	15,8	9,7	20,0	44,8	0,0
Alternative teacher education programmes: accelerated pre-service TT schemes or on-the-job learning programs/in-service TT for underqualified teachers	18	13,7	18,2	0,0	16,1	20,0	17,2	12,9
Use of contract teachers (≠ civil servant status)	23	17,6	0,0	0,0	9,7	20,0	48,3	12,9
Flexibilisation of entry paths (professionals trained in other disciplines)	2	1,5	9,1	0,0	0,0	10,0	0,0	0,0
School-based management (w. teacher management/control provisions)	25	19,1	0,0	0,0	12,9	10,0	62,1	6,5
Performance-based incentives: bonuses, performance-related pay, widening of salary scale differentiation	22	16,8	27,3	15,8	6,5	0,0	31,0	16,1
Establishment of (govt. managed) monitoring systems: development or strengthening of inspectorates, capacity building, training of officials, EMIS	75	57,3	27,3	36,8	54,8	90,0	69,0	61,3
Deployment policies: hardship bonuses; incentives to teach critical subjects, redeploying of teaching force; reconsideration of transfer criteria	22	16,8	9,1	10,5	9,7	30,0	20,7	22,6

Higher teacher/students ratios; optimisation	9	6,9	9,1	31,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	6,5
Competitive and/or punctual payment of salaries, improved labour conditions	12	9,2	0,0	15,8	6,5	10,0	6,9	12,9
Additional recruitment and/or provision of substitute teachers	26	19,8	9,1	0,0	19,4	20,0	44,8	12,9
Incentives for woman to enter pre-service training or the profession	10	7,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	10,0	17,2	12,9

Appendix 2. List of Knowledge Products

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Appendix 3. List of Lending Projects

PROJECT IDENTIFICATION	COUNTRY	AREA
P091747	Vietnam	East Asia Pacific
P085260	Vietnam	East Asia Pacific
P094063	Philippines	East Asia Pacific
P095873	Timor-Leste	East Asia Pacific
P096328	Mongolia	East Asia Pacific
P097104	Indonesia	East Asia Pacific
P120890	Timor-Leste	East Asia Pacific
P070668	Cambodia	East Asia Pacific
P111059	Mongolia	East Asia Pacific
P118494	Lao PDR	East Asia Pacific
P118931	Philippines	East Asia Pacific
P078976	Kyrgyz Republic	Europe Central Asia
P084597	Montenegro	Europe Central Asia
P086671	Croatia	Europe Central Asia
P090340	Moldova	Europe Central Asia
P094042	Uzbekistan	Europe Central Asia
P098217	Georgia	Europe Central Asia
P102117	Azerbaijan	Europe Central Asia
P102174	Kosovo	Europe Central Asia
P107772	Armenia	Europe Central Asia
P107845	Uzbekistan	Europe Central Asia

P113350	Kyrgyz Republic	Europe Central Asia
P143060	Georgia	Europe Central Asia
P066149	Turkey	Europe Central Asia
P127388	Moldova	Europe Central Asia
P129552	Moldova	Europe Central Asia
P129597	Georgia	Europe Central Asia
P077738	Ukraine	Europe Central Asia
P078933	Albania	Europe Central Asia
P079226	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Europe Central Asia

PROJECT IDENTIFICATION	COUNTRY	AREA
P078993	El Salvador	Latin America and the Caribbean
P082908	Colombia	Latin America and the Caribbean
P085851	Mexico	Latin America and the Caribbean
P087831	Ecuador	Latin America and the Caribbean
P089898	Guatemala	Latin America and the Caribbean
P101218	Honduras	Latin America and the Caribbean
P106621	Haiti	Latin America and the Caribbean
P106686	Panama	Latin America and the Caribbean
P107146	Brazil	Latin America and the Caribbean
P107407	Jamaica	Latin America and the Caribbean
P120830	Brazil	Latin America and the Caribbean
P052608	Colombia	Latin America and the Caribbean
P069934	Brazil	Latin America and the Caribbean
P099918	Haiti	Latin America and the Caribbean
P101369	Mexico	Latin America and the Caribbean
P105555	Panama	Latin America and the Caribbean
P106208	Brazil	Latin America and the Caribbean
P111662	Uruguay	Latin America and the Caribbean
P112262	Mexico	Latin America and the Caribbean
P122370	Guatemala	Latin America and the Caribbean
P123151	Peru	Latin America and the Caribbean
P124134	Haiti	Latin America and the Caribbean
P126297	Mexico	Latin America and the Caribbean
P126343	Brazil	Latin America and the Caribbean
P126351	Brazil	Latin America and the Caribbean
P126357	Nicaragua	Latin America and the Caribbean
P126364	El Salvador	Latin America and the Caribbean
P126372	Brazil	Latin America and the Caribbean
P126408	Uruguay	Latin America and the Caribbean
P126452	Brazil	Latin America and the Caribbean
P070963	Argentina	Latin America and the Caribbean
P086994	Djibouti	Middle East North Africa
P089761	Yemen, Rep.	Middle East North Africa
P105036	Jordan	Middle East North Africa
P117838	Morocco	Middle East North Africa
P118187	Lebanon	Middle East North Africa
P120541	Morocco	Middle East North Africa
P133699	Yemen, Rep.	Middle East North Africa
P043412	Morocco	Middle East North Africa
P130853	Yemen, Rep.	Middle East North Africa



P076185	Yemen, Rep.	Middle East North Africa
P083964	Afghanistan	South Asia
P084580	Sri Lanka	South Asia
P090346	Pakistan	South Asia
P097471	Pakistan	South Asia
P100846	Pakistan	South Asia
P101243	Pakistan	South Asia
P084567	Bangladesh	South Asia
P102541	Bangladesh	South Asia
P102608	Pakistan	South Asia

PROJECT IDENTIFICATION	COUNTRY	AREA
P106161	Bangladesh	South Asia
P106259	Afghanistan	South Asia
P107300	Pakistan	South Asia
P107558	Nepal	South Asia
P113435	Bangladesh	South Asia
P113441	Nepal	South Asia
P113488	Sri Lanka	South Asia
P118445	India	South Asia
P131394	Bangladesh	South Asia
P094086	Pakistan (Baluchistan)	South Asia
P102547	India	South Asia
P118673	India	South Asia
P125610	Nepal	South Asia
P125952	Pakistan	South Asia
P125958	Pakistan	South Asia
P131331	Maldives	South Asia
P074633	Nepal	South Asia
P077789	Bangladesh	South Asia
P097636	Pakistan	South Asia
P124913	Pakistan	South Asia
P086294	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Sub-Saharan Africa
P086875	Namibia	Sub-Saharan Africa
P087479	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa
P089254	Senegal	Sub-Saharan Africa
P093991	Mali	Sub-Saharan Africa
P096151	Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa
P097325	Uganda	Sub-Saharan Africa
P098956	Burkina Faso	Sub-Saharan Africa
P101232	Uganda	Sub-Saharan Africa
P102262	Tanzania	Sub-Saharan Africa
P106280	Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa
P106855	Ethiopia	Sub-Saharan Africa
P110803	Uganda	Sub-Saharan Africa
P111304	Guinea	Sub-Saharan Africa
P114847	Malawi	Sub-Saharan Africa
P114866	Tanzania	Sub-Saharan Africa
P120783	Gambia, The	Sub-Saharan Africa
P133333	Senegal	Sub-Saharan Africa
P122124	Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa
P123353	Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa

P125127	Mozambique	Sub-Saharan Africa
P128284	Senegal	Sub-Saharan Africa
P128891	Ethiopia	Sub-Saharan Africa
P083326	Madagascar	Sub-Saharan Africa
P084317	Congo, Rep.	Sub-Saharan Africa
P064557	Burundi	Sub-Saharan Africa
P074132	Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa
P075964	Cameroon	Sub-Saharan Africa
P131945	Madagascar	Sub-Saharan Africa
P132617	Chad	Sub-Saharan Africa
P077903	Gambia, The	Sub-Saharan Africa

Appendix 4. Data Collection instrument

Complete reference	
Year	
Geographic area	
Knowledge product genre / Type of financial product	
Teacher-related issues	
<i>High absence rates</i>	References to teachers' absence from classroom during school time, whether deliberate (i.e. resulting from "cheating" and with an important component of volition) or involuntary (as a consequence of issues beyond their control - see " <i>Extenuating circumstances</i> ").
<i>Lack of effort</i>	References to poor teaching as a consequence of idleness during instructional hours (as opposed to a hard-working or industrious attitude), including an intentional loss of instruction time, a poor use of available material, a deliberate neglect of responsibilities, inactivity or lack of engagement when in classroom and unofficial "shortenings" of the school day or week.
<i>"Extenuating circumstances"</i>	References to the impact of factors with a significant impact on teachers' attendance or performance, mitigating the component of intentionality of teachers' absences or poor teaching. Among others, this category would contemplate the effect of school location (rural or remote areas), the impact of illness-related issues (particularly HIV/AIDS affecting teachers or teachers' relatives), external obligations (such as electoral duties), the need to travel to collect salaries or participate in training and the impact of second jobs (" <i>moonlighting</i> " resulting from low salaries) or double-shift schemes.
<i>Inadequate in-school supervision</i>	References to the poor management of teachers on the part of in-school superiors (school head or principals). This category deals with questions specifically related to control and monitoring - as opposed to pedagogic support and general co-ordination. Hence, it considers only those documents regretting the poor or limited role of principals from a "managerialist" approach (as a consequence of poor training, inadequate selection of insufficient decision-making powers). (Generalist comments or observations lacking specificity have been excluded here, which probably leads to "conservative" estimations).
<i>Poor community or parental supervision</i>	References to the poor management of teachers on the part of local communities, parents or school communities or councils. The category takes into consideration those documents pointing to the lack of effective monitoring or control of teachers (and particularly teachers' attendance) as a consequence of insufficient decision-making power or "self-perceived" disempowerment (as in the case of little-educated families), as well as resulting from insufficient training or awareness of responsibilities.

<i>Poor administrative or institutional management</i>	References to the ineffective teacher management on the part of education authorities. This category contemplates those comments on poor institutional development or capacity as well as the absence of control and monitoring systems. Hence (and as opposed to "Absence of incentives and permanent tenure") it does not make references to the absence of specific solutions to (potential) management problems, but rather to a poorly developed administrative infrastructure (ineffective inspection and disciplinary systems) and/or generalist comments on "failures of accountability".
<i>Absence of incentives and permanent tenure</i>	References on the absence of performance-based incentives (including monetary and non-monetary bonuses or rewards), on "flat" salary scales (not affected by teachers' performance), on promotions and career advancement not subject to performance and on job stability (schemes or dispositions making the dismissal of (reportedly) underperforming teachers difficult: open-ended appointments and permanent tenure) and criticisms to the civil servant status of teachers. More generally, this category includes those products taking a critical stance on the labour conditions characteristic of the public sector, considered to have harmful effects on the motivation and accountability of teachers.
<i>Poor teacher education</i>	References to the insufficiency and poor quality of pre-service teacher training, compounded by poor quality, unavailability or non-mandatory professional development, and leading to a scarcely qualified teacher force. This category includes comments on the inadequate content and methodologies or teacher training, references to ill-prepared teacher educators and to the lack of a proper infrastructure; comments on an excessively liberalised sector and on the weak coupling with education authorities.
<i>Unqualified teachers</i>	References to the presence of untrained teachers in the profession (or trained below the level required by education authorities) or to the lack of a certification process delimiting a pool of qualified teachers. The category also includes documents containing critical comments on the use of para-teachers or contract teachers on the basis of their low levels of qualifications.
<i>Attraction of less-prepared candidates</i>	References to difficulties in attracting better-prepared individuals to the profession, whether as a consequence of unselective teacher training programmes unable to choose the best candidates or as a consequence of unattractive labour conditions or the poor recognition enjoyed by the profession.
<i>Inadequate pedagogical practices and weak subject knowledge</i>	References to the employment of obsolete or inappropriate methodologies. Given the scarcity of allusions to the issues, compounded by the lack of detail of the comments, the specific attributes of these inadequate practices are difficult to identify.
<i>Critical subject shortages</i>	References to critical subject shortages or to the lack of specialists.
<i>Lack of female teachers</i>	References to the insufficiency of female teachers.
<i>Uneven distribution</i>	References to the co-existence of shortages in rural or remote areas with surpluses in urban or better-off areas or the concentration of low-performing teachers in disadvantaged areas as a consequence of inadequate transfer criteria or deployment policies.
<i>Teacher shortages</i>	References to an insufficient teaching force as a consequence of attrition rates, a low output of training institutions, unattractive labour conditions, etc.
<i>Proportion of education budgets allocated to teacher salaries</i>	References to high proportion of education budgets allocated to teacher salaries or salary related expenditures.
<i>Inefficient use of resources</i>	References to inefficiencies related to low ratios, light workloads, the proportion of non-teaching staff, or excessively high salaries
<i>Corruption</i>	References to corruption, misgovernance, rent-seeking or nepotism in hiring and/or deploying practices, including mentions of "ghost teachers" (existing only on the payroll but not actually teaching in the assigned post).
<i>Inadequate labour conditions</i>	References to low and/or unpunctual remuneration: salaries depending on or topped up by parental or community contributions or the lack of labour protection.

Policy solutions	
<i>Improved training</i>	Revision of pre-service teacher training and encouragement of professional development in order to upgrade teachers' skills. This category includes those policies suggesting a modernisation or strengthening of teacher training programmes, as opposed to schemes aiming at accelerating or flexibilising teacher training.
<i>More selective teacher training</i>	Use of more selective criteria and higher standards determining the access to pre-service teacher education.
<i>Extended classroom experience</i>	Requirement of (additional) classroom experience during pre-service training and before joining the teaching force.
<i>Peer-to-peer support and networking</i>	Programmes establishing forms of collaboration between teachers with similar positions within in-school hierarchy (including mentoring and induction programmes for novice teachers - not involving probation - and forms of mutual support), jointly with collaboration schemes between schools.
<i>Raising hiring standards</i>	Establishment or revision of the teaching certification leading to the creation of a pre-qualified teachers' pool or to a (more) selective licencing process.
<i>Contract teachers</i>	Use of contract teachers, i.e. teachers employed on a temporary basis by means of a contract (as opposed to open-ended appointments characteristic of a public servant status), usually earning a significantly lower salary. Teachers are expected to be hired by education authorities or by local communities.
<i>Alternative entries to the profession (KP) / Accelerated and on-the-job training (LP)</i>	Flexibilisation of entry paths to the profession, allowing the employment of untrained teachers (or teachers holding credentials below the required level) and promoting accelerated or on-the-job teacher training schemes (e.g. systems providing minimal pre-service training in combination with in-service training).
<i>School-based management and community control</i>	Assignment of decision-making power (regarding teachers) to local communities or school councils, by means of strong forms of school-based management or the empowerment or training of school committees and local councils. This category includes any scheme providing parents or citizen committees with significant and increased responsibilities, including hiring and firing teachers or monitoring their attendance.
<i>Policies facilitating dismissals</i>	Advocacy for the creation of a separate teaching service with a status different from civil servants, jointly with policies aimed at facilitating the removal of underperforming teachers (including probation periods and performance-conditioned tenures)
<i>Performance-based incentives</i>	Setting up of performance-based incentives, including bonuses and rewards, performance-related pay, increased salary scale differentiation and performance-dependent career advancement opportunities.
<i>Increased government monitoring</i>	Improvement or establishment of systems monitoring teachers' attendance or performance, without further detail on the consequences of these assessments or surveys. This category also includes recommendations for capacity building and institutional development regarding teachers' management (including the strengthening of inspectorates, training of officials, systematisation of data, etc.)
<i>Empowered school principals</i>	Increased principals' decision-making power regarding teachers' management.
<i>Deployment policies: hardship bonuses</i>	Hardship bonuses directed at ensuring an equitable distribution of teachers.
<i>Increased teacher/student ratio</i>	Policies directed at increasing the teacher/student ratio.
<i>Multigrade teaching</i>	Establishment, training on or support of multigrade or multisubject teaching.
<i>Teachers' welfare</i>	Policies with an effect on teachers' welfare, including increased remuneration, punctual payment of salaries, or the protection of labour rights.
<i>Additional recruitment</i>	Programmes aiming at increasing the teaching force or establishing substitution schemes in order to reduce teacher/pupil ratio or to address teacher absences.
<i>Female teachers</i>	Incentives for women to enter pre-service training or the profession.
<i>Revision of time allocations</i>	Official stipulations on time allocations and consideration of non-teaching tasks.
Comments on teachers' unions	
General comments	



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Education International is the global union federation representing more than 32 million teachers, professors and education workers from pre-school to university in more than 171 countries and territories around the globe.

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